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This thesis investigates why U.S. space cooperation efforts with Latin American 
countries have decreased over the past three decades. This thesis also addresses the 
following questions: Is the reduced number of U.S.–Latin American space cooperation 
projects an indication of a loss of U.S. regional influence? Is there an indication of a shift 
in the “partner of choice”? If so, what are the factors “alienating” the U.S. and preventing 
the establishment of cooperative space efforts, and what can be done about them? 
This thesis argues that U.S.–Latin American space cooperation has decreased due 
to the increased availability of providers, the maturing domestic space sectors, and the 
committed drive toward technological independence. Latin American countries are 
pursuing space capabilities mainly to support socio-economic development efforts. Their 
specific resource constraints motivate them to pursue cooperative projects. The 
increasing availability of providers allows for greater flexibility, and Latin American 
countries chose engagements that best suit their requirements. Therefore, the smaller 
number of cooperative U.S.–Latin American space projects is not an indication of a loss 
of U.S. regional influence but instead of a competitive market with pragmatic consumer 
base. Thus, the United States is not being “alienated” but challenged to engage on 
equitable terms.  
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In recent years, the substantial benefits provided by space capabilities have turned 
this realm into a congested and contested environment, as more nations seek to pursue 
their own efforts. While this arena continues to be dominated by traditional world 
powers, less developed nations use partnerships to supplement their domestic programs in 
order to establish their capabilities. Countries in Latin America are no exception and, 
during the mid-1980s, Brazil and Mexico became the first in the region to gain space 
capabilities through cooperative ventures in the form of commercial technology transfers 
with U.S. companies.1 Argentina followed suit and established its presence in space by 
purchasing a U.S.-made microsatellite in 1990.2 Today, the United Nations Office of 
Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) registry contains data for over 70 payloads from ten 
different countries in Latin America.3 Four Latin American countries—Brazil, Argentina, 
and Mexico—are found in the list of the top 25 countries in the registry: a clear testament 
to the region’s interest in space.4 
My analysis of UNOOSA registry data reveals that a decade after the first Latin 
American payload was placed into orbit, the partnership preference of countries within 
the region has changed. During the first decade (1985-1995) 73% of the registered 
payloads involved U.S. participation.5 This percentage decreased to 56% (1996-2005), 
                                                 
1 United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), “Online Index of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space,” accessed February 19, 2018, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/search-ng.jspx?lf_id=. 
2 Mathew B. Garvin, “Launching Latin America: International and Domestic Factors in National Space 
Programs” (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 58–59, 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/44569/14Dec_Garvin_Matthew.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowe
d=y. 
3 UNOOSA, “Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space.” 
4 UNOOSA, “Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space.” 
5 UNOOSA, “Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space.” 
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and 26% (2006-2015) during the following two decades (Figure 1).6 In 1995, Chile 
registered its first satellite, which formed part of the Chilean Air Force (Fuerza Aerea 
Satellite [FASat] program.7 The FASAT-Alfa satellite was acquired through a commercial 
cooperative effort with a British company without U.S. involvement.8 The first space 
payloads registered by Uruguay, Bolivia, and Venezuela followed Chile’s non-U.S.-
aligned approach and established cooperative efforts with Argentina and China.9 Other 
countries like Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador avoided cooperative projects and developed 
their first payloads domestically through university projects, although they still had to 
rely on foreign assistance for launch.10 Furthermore, traditionally aligned countries, such 
as the regional leader Brazil, might be breaking away in an attempt to end/reduce their 
reliance on the U.S. The China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) program 
established in 198811 was the first evidence of the breakaway, which is also seen in the 
recent Brazilian acquisition of two French-built communications satellites.12  
                                                 
6 Calculation performed with data found in the UNOOSA registry database, obtained by using search 
function to produce a list of payloads registered by Latin American countries. Each Latin American country 
was searched and the registered assets were copied into the table found in the Appendix. Further research 
was performed on all registered payloads to determine the parties involved in their manufacture using open 
source information and websites such as SpaceflightNow, Gunter’s Space Page, NASA SpaceFlight, and 
other prime contractor sites. The percentages were calculated by dividing the number of projects that 
included U.S. involvement by the total number of projects registered in that decade. The identified trend is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
7 Garvin, “Launching Latin America,” 76. 
8 “EoPortal Directory: FASat-Bravo,” eo Sharing Earth Observation Resources, accessed February 19, 
2018, https://directory.eoportal.org/web/eoportal/satellite-missions/f/fasat-bravo. 
9 United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), “UNOOSA Online Index of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space.” 
10 United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). 
11 James Clay Moltz, “Brazil’s Space Program: Dreaming with Its Feet on the Ground,” Space Policy 
33 (August 1, 2015): 15, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2015.05.001. 
12 “SGDC Information Page,” Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation, and 
Communications, accessed July 15, 2017, http://www.telebras.com.br/sgdc/?lang=en. 
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Figure 1.  Decrease in U.S.–Latin American Cooperative Projects13 
The observed decrease in U.S.–Latin American space cooperation projects and the 
perceived distancing of countries from the United States are intriguing due to the United 
States’ unquestioned space power prestige and historical regional dominance. These 
developments are also troubling in terms of the possible harm they pose to U.S. interests 
in the region. However, this thesis proposes that the observed decrease is a result of 
increased availability of providers, the maturing domestic space sectors, and the 
committed drive toward technological independence. The smaller number of cooperative 
U.S.–Latin American space projects is not an indication of a loss of U.S. regional 
influence, but instead of a competitive market with a pragmatic consumer base. Thus, the 
U.S. is not being “alienated” but challenged to engage on equitable terms. 
                                                 
13 Data displayed on this graph is based on calculations performed with data found in the UNOOSA 
registry database, obtained by using search function to produce a list of payloads registered by Latin 
American countries. Each Latin American country was searched and the registered assets were copied into 
the table found in the Appendix. Further research was performed on all registered payloads to determine the 
parties involved in their manufacture using open source information and websites such as SpaceflightNow, 
Gunter’s Space Page, NASA SpaceFlight, and other prime contractor sites. The percentages were 
calculated by dividing the number of projects that included U.S. involvement by the total number of 
projects registered in that decade. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis investigates why U.S. space cooperation efforts with Latin American 
countries have decreased over the past three decades. This inquiry is underlined by the 
following questions: Why and through what means are Latin American countries 
pursuing space capabilities? Why are they choosing other partners to establish their 
footholds in space or avoiding cooperation all together? Is the reduced number of U.S.–
Latin American space cooperation projects an indication of a loss of U.S. regional 
influence? Is there an indication of a shift in the “partner of choice”? If so, what are the 
factors “alienating” the U.S. and preventing the establishment of cooperative space 
efforts, and what can be done about them? 
This inquiry may reveal potential hindering factors such as trade restrictions, 
partnership suitability, ideological differences, technological security concerns, or 
conflicts of interest. This research is significant due to its ties to geopolitics, the 
SOUTHCOM lines of effort,14 and national industrial complex objectives. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The June 2010 United States National Space Policy contains as one of its goals 
“the expansion of international cooperation on mutually beneficial space activities to: 
broaden and extend the benefits of space; further the peaceful use of space; and enhance 
collection and partnership in sharing of space-derived information.”15 Due to its 
importance, the three sectors of the U.S. space enterprise—civil, military, and 
commercial—are directed to pursue cooperative efforts by engaging their counterparts in 
other nations.16  
                                                 
14U.S. SOUTHCOM’s mission involves three lines of effort: building relationships, countering threat 
networks, and enabling rapid response. Being the preferred security partner is encompassed in the building 
relationships line of effort as cited at: “SOUTHCOM Lines of Effort,” U.S. Southern Command, accessed 
March 5, 2018, http://www.southcom.mil/Lines-of-Effort/. 
15 Barack H. Obama, National Space Policy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2010), 4. 
16 Obama, 7. 
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One of the earliest and most illustrative applications of this concept was the 
Apollo-Soyuz mission, which brought Russian and American scientists together from 
1972 to 1975.17 Civil space cooperation has evolved to allow ambitious projects like the 
International Space Station (ISS) to become a reality. Military space cooperative efforts 
include projects such as the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and the 
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) communications systems. The AEHF constellation 
serves U.S. and international partners, including Canada, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom.18 The WGS program is unique in its use of commercial best practices in its 
acquisition. These cooperative practices increased the pace of development and allowed 
U.S. allies to invest “proportional to their specific level of MILSATCOM needs.”19 
Currently, the WGS constellation serves Australia, Canada, Netherlands, Luxemburg, 
Denmark, and New Zealand.20 The commercial sector is often the most engaged through 
the sale and transfer of technology and has most notably enabled less developed nations 
to establish footholds in space.  
International space cooperation offers important financial, military, and 
geopolitical benefits for the participating parties. Financial benefits can be achieved from 
the savings associated with the divvying of the astonishing costs associated with space 
technology research, development, and application. Cost-saving benefits are more 
obvious and feasible in cooperative efforts amongst near-peer participants, especially in 
complex ventures such as the ISS, but can also be obtained from the sale of technology 
and related services to less developed partners. Both types of cooperation provide the 
added bonus of boosting the transferring nation’s space industrial complex through 
increased competitiveness and access to markets.  
                                                 
17 Jim Wilson, “Apollo-Soyuz: An Orbital Partnership Begins,” NASA, June 10, 2015, 
http://www.nasa.gov/topics/history/features/astp.html. 
18 Lockheed Martin, “Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF),” accessed February 21, 2018, 
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/advanced-extremely-high-frequency--aehf-.html. 
19 Boeing Corporation, “Wideband Global SATCOM,” November 2015, 
http://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/space/boeing_satellite_family/pdf/Bkgd_WGS.pdf, 5. 
20 Boeing Corporation, “Wideband Global SATCOM,” November 2015, 
http://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/space/boeing_satellite_family/pdf/Bkgd_WGS.pdf. 
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The military benefits augment any existing efforts to build partnership capacity. 
Strong partnership capacity enhances the United States’ ability to achieve national 
security objectives in a given country or region by facilitating collaboration between U.S. 
and host nation forces. Cooperation in space-related projects strengthens the bonds 
between military forces and can establish means to increase satellite constellation 
resiliency through disaggregation or hosted payload architectures. These military 
advantages can consequently strengthen the U.S. posture in a conflict against a near-peer 
rival.  
Lastly, from a geopolitical stance, space cooperation offers the opportunity to 
forge diplomatic relationships that can help achieve strategic objectives. It can help rally 
support behind specific space-related items of interest, such as orbit and frequency 
allocation, the peaceful and responsible use of space, and space governance, but can also 
solidify political and economic influence in the region. The benefits, of course, have to be 
weighed against the possible negative effects of increased technical risks, management 
complexities, and exposure to political risks.21 However, NASA and other U.S. 
organizations have historically judged the risks worth taking.22 
Inquiring into the potential shift of the Latin American space sector is important 
for U.S. foreign and domestic policy due to the region’s significant national security and 
geopolitical importance. A misalignment in regard to new entrant nations or a shift by 
historically aligned partners could be detrimental to the U.S., not only for the lost benefits 
for the space enterprise, but also due to the indication of diminishing influence within the 
region. One of the SOUTHCOM lines of effort is to be the “preferred partner.”23 A 
diminishing influence could affect this and other military missions to include the U.S. 
fight against transregional narcotics and terrorist networks. Furthermore, from a policy 
                                                 
21 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), “U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Space,” 
OTA-ISS-618 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1995), 71. 
22 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 71. 
23 “U.S. SOUTHCOM Lines of Effort: Building Relationships,” U.S. Southern Command, accessed 
March 5, 2018, http://www.southcom.mil/Lines-of-Effort/Building-Relationships/. 
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perspective, this inquiry may reveal actionable insights that can help advance U.S. 
interests, whether by revising trade restrictions or by adjusting foreign policy.  
Additionally, this inquiry can contribute to U.S. knowledge in regard to Latin 
American space policy decision-making. Except in a few cases,24 the literature so far has 
been focused on assessing the aims, limitations, and priorities of Latin American space 
programs but has yet to address how these factors affect partnership preference.25 This 
thesis can potentially fill this void and assess how the identified factors interact and result 
in the observed outcomes. This, in turn, could help formulate an approach that 
encourages U.S. partnerships with Latin American countries and other emerging space 
nations.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The available literature on the subject of the Latin American space sector is 
limited and does not address directly the factors affecting countries’ decisions to align 
with one partner versus another. However, two themes can be derived from related 
works: one, that space cooperation projects depend on active U.S. engagement; and two, 
that Latin American countries exercise full agency in their pragmatic selection of 
partners. Other related literature provides valuable information regarding the aims and 
motivations behind Latin American space programs.  
The U.S.-centric theme is based on the history of U.S. space cooperation with 
other countries. Beginning in the early 1960s, the U.S. sought cooperative opportunities 
with the Soviet Union in order to advance its own interests in space.26 The interests 
pursued ranged from creating means of dialogue to exploiting Soviet scientific 
advantages in areas where the U.S. lagged.27 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
                                                 
24 Laura M. Delgado-López, “Sino-Latin American Space Cooperation: A Smart Move,” Space Policy 
28, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 7–14, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2011.12.009. 
25 Robert C. Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries: The Search for Security and 
Development on the Final Frontier, 1 ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 145–65. 
26 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), “U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Space,” 42. 
27 U.S. Congress, OTA, 42. 
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U.S. utilized space cooperation as a means to “promote economic and political stability in 
Russia and to provide tangible incentives for positive Russian behavior in areas such as 
preventing proliferation of missile and other military technologies.”28 This self-interested 
approach is also observed in cooperative efforts with Japan, where transfer agreements of 
rocket technology were used as a means to increase dependency on U.S. technology.29 In 
the Latin American region, the U.S. avoided collaborating in Brazil’s efforts to mature its 
rocket technology in order to stem its missile program.30 In 1987, the U.S. created the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), hindering Brazil’s chances of procuring 
missile technology through other means.31 These examples illustrate that space 
cooperation depends on U.S. initiative.32 This argument is reinforced by the historic U.S. 
trend of neglect toward Latin America, except during times when its interests in the 
region have been challenged.33 The self-interest and neglect arguments re-enforce the 
idea that Latin American countries are in a waiting mode until the U.S. decides to engage 
them to pursue space partnerships. But, in the presence of new partner options today, this 
may no longer be the case. 
Indeed, authors like Laura M. Delgado suggest that Latin American countries 
have more agency in the matter. Delgado’s analysis of Sino-Latin American cooperation 
claims that Latin American countries approach space cooperation pragmatically. 
Partnership becomes an option when a country’s “interest in space [intersects with] 
domestic and international pressures toward […] cooperation.”34 The pragmatic approach  
 
                                                 
28 U.S. Congress, OTA, 46. 
29 James Clay Moltz, Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International 
Risks (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 50. 
30 Moltz, “Brazil’s Space Program,” 15. 
31 Moltz, 15. 
32 Johanna Mendelson Forman et al., “Toward the Heavens, Latin America’s Emerging Space 
Programs” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 2009), 1. 
33 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World, 4 ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 338–41. 
34 Delgado-López, “Sino-Latin American Space Cooperation,” 13. 
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entails evaluating the various factors as motivations, aims, priorities,35 and limitations.36 
This view is supported by existing literature on the nature of Latin American foreign 
policy.37 Contrary to some beliefs,38 Latin American foreign policy enjoys a significant 
amount of agency that overcomes even the strongest foreign influence.39 Given the strong 
ties that exist between space and foreign policy, it can be asserted that the agency theme 
is valid, and perhaps more credible than other explanations in explaining the partnership 
preferences in the Latin American space sector.  
Other available literature outside the two major themes addresses the aims and 
motivations behind Latin American and other developing nations’ space programs. 
Robert Newberry provides an overview of Latin American space programs with a focus 
on assessing their stance in regard to the United States. Newberry analyzes the behavior 
and types of projects to determine if a specific country is a U.S. colleague or 
competitor.40 His assessment deems countries with cooperative projects with the U.S. as 
collaborators while those with established partnerships with others as competitors. This 
thesis employs the same U.S.-centered focus combined with Delgado’s analysis approach 
of domestic and international context to determine partnership feasibility.   
Robert Harding builds on Newberry’s work and ventures into researching the 
rationale behind developing countries’ space programs as a whole in terms of their 
motivations, aims, and role in their broader economic development.41 He concludes that 
the search for national prestige remains as one of the main factors causing developing 
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nations to invest their precious and scarce resources in space assets, in addition to the 
social and economic development benefits that space capabilities provide.42 Harding’s 
excellent overview of emerging Latin American space programs provides valuable 
information for the proposed partnership preference analysis.  
Mathew Garvin uses Harding and Newberry’s work in his thesis, identifying the 
factors hindering the development of Latin American space programs. He concludes that 
domestic prioritization and inconsistent political environments have prevented the takeoff 
of Latin American space programs.43 In relation to the proposed research, Garvin claims 
that U.S. trade restrictions have contributed to the alignment of Latin American countries 
with U.S. competitors and recommends increased engagement through civil, military, and 
commercial cooperation.44 This work is valuable because the factors it identifies can be 
used to establish a basis of analysis to determine partnership preferences. 
In summary, the available literature does not address the proposed question 
directly. However, the two overarching themes that emerge suggest that the decisions 
behind the establishment of a space cooperation effort lies somewhere in between U.S. 
decisions and Latin American agency. Preliminary research reveals that trade 
restrictions45 and increased competitiveness46 between providers of space technology 
within the region are two potential factors affecting space cooperation. This revelation 
necessitates further inquiry to reveal other variables affecting the space cooperation 
equation.   
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES  
The review of related available literature reveals three potential hypotheses for the 
proposed question. First, it can be hypothesized that the decreasing number of 
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cooperative U.S.–Latin American space projects results from U.S. neglect.47 Given the 
history of a self-centered approach to space cooperation and the pattern of neglect toward 
Latin America, it can be concluded that the number of U.S.–Latin America cooperative 
projects have decreased due to their low strategic value to the U.S. This hypothesis is 
credible; however, the growing number of emerging space players constitutes a potential 
risk to U.S. interests, due to the sensitivity of space sustainment.48 This risk associated 
with space security49 could prompt even a major space power like to U.S. to engage 
developing countries, even if there is no direct tangible gain from the specific cooperative 
effort. Space is a sensitive realm where inexperience can bring detrimental outcomes, 
such as the unintentional creation of space debris. Space debris increases the risk of 
collision with orbiting assets to include critical national security systems.   
Second, it can be argued that U.S.–Latin America space collaboration has 
decreased because Latin American countries have not desired it, or have been 
purposefully distancing themselves from the U.S. Latin American countries could 
exercise their agency and choose a partner that is more ideologically aligned or is willing 
to provide the services they require. Two potential examples are the Bolivian50 and 
Venezuelan51 partnerships with China. Both countries have rhetorically proclaimed their 
political differences with the U.S., and their space partnerships with a strategic rival hint 
of a significant influence of ideology in their decision-making. Furthermore, Brazil and 
other Latin American countries have also shown their agency through their misalignment 
with Washington in regard to recent space policy and governance debates. These 
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countries have supported the “Sino-Russian draft treaty on Prevention of the Placement 
of Weapons in Outer Space and opposed the European Union’s effort to develop a 
voluntary Code of Conduct for space activities.”52  
Although the idea that Latin American countries have agency is reasonable, it is 
far-fetched to claim they do not engage in U.S. cooperative efforts solely due to issues of 
ideology. The U.S. is unquestionably the world leader in space technology and the 
prestige-driven nature of the sector would undoubtedly attract potential partners even 
when there are conflicting views. For example, President Cristina Kirchner’s rhetoric 
may have suggested misalignment with Washington.53 However, despite the potential 
differences between countries, the SAC satellite series program continued successfully.54 
Even Hugo Chavez maintained a reasonable level of pragmatism during the first two 
years of his administration, and allowed the continuance of Venezuela’s military 
cooperation agreement with the U.S. up to 2004.55 What may be interpreted as a “push-
away” is most likely a drive toward developing domestic capabilities and decreasing 
overall reliance on foreign technology. 
The third and perhaps more credible hypothesis is that space cooperation has been 
limited due to a combination of hindering factors, such as harsh U.S. trade restrictions, 
issues of trust, conflicting goals, and diverse availability of providers. These factors are 
addressed only sporadically in the literature but undoubtedly play an important role in the 
space cooperation equation. The U.S.-imposed restriction on exports of space technology 
through the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) is the one of the most 
mentioned limiting factors. In the early 1990s, U.S. space companies Loral and Hughes 
Space & Communications were involved in a controversial case with the Chinese that 
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raised suspicions of potential compromise of sensitive space technology.56 Both 
companies were eventually found guilty and fined for ITAR violations in 1997.57 This 
case prompted the implementation of the Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act, 
which increased the sensitivity and complexity of cooperative efforts involving space 
technology.58 Data suggests that as a result, U.S. companies chose or were forced to limit 
their engagement in foreign markets. Analyses on the economic impacts of ITAR reveal a 
drop in U.S. market share of satellite exports from 63 to 41 percent from 1995 to 2005.59  
The registry dates of various Latin American space assets suggests their 
development could have been affected by ITAR, especially the ones registered before 
President Obama’s directed review in 2009.60 From a U.S. perspective, the amount of 
effort that a company must go through to ensure ITAR compliance or to create ITAR-
compliant products may have outweighed the benefits of a potential increase in market 
share. From a Latin American perspective, the available ITAR-compliant products may 
have not been suitable in fulfilling the desired objectives. Overall, ITAR could have 
made U.S.–Latin American cooperative efforts less attractive.  
The issue of trust could result from past cooperative experiences. In Latin 
America, Brazil is considered the poster child for space. However, the history of U.S.-
Brazilian cooperation does not set good precedents for future cooperative endeavors. In 
1997, President Bill Clinton visited Brazil and signed an agreement establishing its 
cooperation in the ISS as a reward for Brazil’s decision to join the MTCR.61 The 
agreement committed “Brazil to provide six specific pieces equipment to be installed on 
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the space station, and NASA agreed to train and fly a Brazilian astronaut to the ISS.”62 
This cooperative effort was noble in purpose, but a failure in practice since Brazil failed 
to deliver on its side of the bargain and other partners had to fulfill its commitments.63 
This pattern with Brazil is observed in its cooperative efforts with Ukraine and Russia, 
and clearly justifies the United States’ hesitancy in trusting Latin America’s space poster 
child and could, by default, affect other countries in the region. On the other hand, trust 
could also be an issue from the Latin American perspective due to the history of U.S. 
engagements in the region. Literature on U.S.–Latin American relations is littered with 
references to “gunboat diplomacy” and other self-serving approaches that could have 
degraded the region’s trust. 
A third probable factor is the presence of conflicting goals. For example, the 2010 
U.S. National Space Policy calls for energizing the competitive advantage of domestic 
industries, to include satellite manufacturing, satellite-based services, and space launch.64 
This objective is derived from the fact that the U.S. space enterprise foundation is its 
commercial sector, and its robustness can only be achieved by making it a priority over 
other goals within the National Space Policy. In clearer terms, space superiority is 
dependent on the commercial sector and, therefore, anything that can cause negative 
effects is in direct opposition of the United States’ primary goal. This is relevant because 
perhaps the most “ideal” U.S. engagement in the Latin America region would be the 
establishment of a cooperative effort with Brazil in the commercialization of the 
Alcantara Launch Center (CLA). This effort could allow the U.S. to launch national 
security payloads from a location closer to the equator, thereby reducing fuel costs and 
simultaneously boost Brazil’s long-sought efforts to establish launch capabilities. 
However, this “ideal” case could be detrimental for U.S. companies like SpaceX, which 
are trying to break into the lucrative launch business. The commercialization of the 
Brazilian CLA facility could negatively affect the drive behind domestic companies as 
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they may struggle to compete with launch costs from the more favorable South America 
location. This hypothetical case shows how conflicting agendas could hinder cooperation 
even though, in reality, the CLA commercialization could have positive effects on U.S. 
launch companies. The obstacles that conflicting goals place on U.S.–Latin America 
cooperation could extend beyond the Brazilian CLA case and also affect the relationships 
with emerging countries and, consequently, affect their partnership choices.  
A fourth factor potentially hindering the establishment of U.S.–Latin American 
space cooperation efforts is the availability of other technology providers. The available 
literature on the Latin American space sector reveals the growing interest that space-
faring nations are paying to the region. Today, Latin American countries are able to select 
the most suitable partner from among different space technology providers and are not 
limited to the traditional U.S. or Russian options.65 The increased competiveness among 
providers widens the range of possible partnerships and, therefore, could affect the 
number of U.S.–Latin American cooperative projects.  
The three proposed hypotheses align with what is known about the nature of Latin 
American foreign policy more generally. The expectation is that the pattern will be 
carried through to space cooperation decision-making.    
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis was accomplished through case studies analysis of three Latin 
American space programs—Peru, Argentina, and Venezuela. Each case study presents a 
chronological account of the respective space program with particular emphasis on the 
cooperative projects each nation has undertaken with other nations that have actually 
resulted in a payload in space. The case studies were selected in an attempt to prove or 
disprove the proposed hypotheses, based on the political history of the country, the 
development of its space program, and its relations with the U.S.  
The Peruvian space program was selected due to Peru’s unique political history. 
For example, Peru is the only country in Latin America to go through a military 
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dictatorship that incorporated left-leaning policies in a time when every other ruling 
military junta applied the opposite. Then, during the region’s recent left turn, Peru 
strengthened its neoliberal economic policies and relationship with the U.S., even though 
the new wave engulfed other governments in the region such as Ecuador, Venezuela, 
Uruguay, and Bolivia. Peru is also known for its conflicts with Chile and Ecuador, and 
even for supporting Argentina during its war against the United Kingdom. Furthermore, 
Peru is the only Latin American member of the Chinese-led Asia-Pacific Space 
Cooperation Organization (APSCO). Overall, Peru’s political history suggested that a 
high level of pragmatism would influence the nature of its space program.  
The Argentine space program was selected as a type of control, due to its strong 
tradition of cooperation with the U.S. The success of the SAC series satellites suggested 
that the history of Argentine space had valuable applicable lessons for the 
implementation of U.S.–Latin American space cooperation projects.  
Lastly, the Venezuelan space program was selected due to the strong indications 
of the influence of ideology and for its established partnership with China. The rise of 
Hugo Chavez and his Bolivarian revolution affected Venezuela’s trajectory drastically. 
Chavez’s anti-American rhetoric suggested that space cooperation projects, especially 
with the U.S., were impossible. The Sino-Venezuelan partnership suggested a loss of 
U.S. influence in the region, and potentially, a diminished prestige in space.       
The investigation focused on the motivations, goals, and priorities of the selected 
space programs as expressed during the ten years leading up the registered date of the 
payload. This time period is based on the average time a Major Defense Acquisition 
Program (MDAP) takes to reach Initial Operational Capability (IOC),66 which is eight 
years, plus two years for the added complexity of cooperative projects. It also aligns 
closely to the time the Sino-Brazilian CBERS program took to place the first payload in 
orbit.  
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The research was assessed in light of the prevailing domestic and international 
context of the time, the space policies of the involved countries for the non-U.S.-involved 
cases, and U.S. space and foreign policies, as well as the factors listed in the hypothesis 
section. This case study analysis allowed for the subjective identification of major factors 
that contributed to a U.S. or non-U.S. partnership.   
This macro-level approach was appropriate due to the ties among foreign, 
domestic, and space policies. Each of the factors of analysis has the potential of affecting 
the viability of a cooperative project since space programs have been historically tied to 
national objectives and foreign policy. From a domestic standpoint, a fiscally constrained 
environment will limit the available funds for investing into the space sector. The 
political environment may dictate limiting economic reforms or alignment with certain 
partners. From the international context, external influences can further complicate the 
picture as different countries use space as a soft power tool.  
This approach builds on the one used by Delgado in her analysis of Sino-Latin 
American space cooperation but takes it a step further by identifying the driving variables 
in the space cooperation equation.  
The analysis was accomplished through readily available open sources. Literature 
on the history of Latin American space programs is available through space- and science-
related journals, as well as notional policy documents through official government 
websites. Latin American foreign policy literature is also available through various 
publications. Domestic and foreign newspaper sources helped frame the domestic and 
international political contexts. Additionally, the author’s Spanish and Portuguese 
language proficiency was amply utilized in the analysis of foreign language sources.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter provided an 
introduction, the major research question, its significance, a review of related literature, 
and three different hypotheses that could answer the research question. The second 
through fourth chapters present the case studies of the Peruvian, Argentine, and 
Venezuelan space programs. Each case study presents the history of that nation’s space 
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program with a specific focus on space cooperation. The history is organized 
chronologically, broken down into major sections that highlight particular shifts in the 
development of the space program or the country’s socio-political context. Each case 
study contains an analysis section that presents the central finding as it relates to the main 
inquiry.  
Chapter II examines the case of the Peruvian space program with a specific focus 
on the acquisition of its first imaging satellite. On 2013, the Peruvian government 
contracted French company, Airbus Defense and Space, for the design, manufacture, and 
launch of PerúSAT-1, and its supporting ground segment. The Peruvian government 
utilized a long and pragmatic approach, requiring a high level of engagement, which 
could have potentially drawn off potential bidders, to include U.S. companies. The profits 
of the project may not have been high enough to entice U.S. bids, especially considering 
the amount of business American companies receive from government contracts and the 
domestic commercial sector.   
Chapter III explores the Argentine space program. The Argentine space program 
was established in the early 1960s with a strong cooperative operational concept. The 
course of its development was interrupted by the Argentine military’s unsanctioned 
pursuit of ballistic missile capabilities in an attempt to make up for its defeat in the 
Falkland Islands war against the United Kingdom. These pursuits caused tension in the 
international system and hindered existing cooperative relationships, especially with the 
U.S. President Saul Menem entered office in the early 1990s and established a political 
approach that ameliorated the strained relationships, ushering a new period of 
development for the Argentine space program. The period of interruption, in an otherwise 
cooperative space program, highlights the importance of institutional capacity for the 
establishment and success of space cooperation projects.   
Chapter IV investigates the case of the Venezuelan space program and its relation 
to Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution. The Venezuelan space program was established 
as a social and economic development tool, but the Chavez and Maduro regimes have 
used it to advance their Bolivarian political objectives. Venezuela established a space 
cooperation agreement with China that has allowed the acquisition of one 
 21 
communications and two imaging satellites. The three Sino-Venezuelan projects were 
established without transparency and limited technical rigor. The nature of the decisions 
highlights how the drive to advance political objectives trump technical decisions.  
The last chapter summarizes the research, analyzes the selected case studies with 
regard to the main inquiry, each other, and the proposed hypotheses, and proposes a 
closing argument. This thesis argues that U.S.–Latin America space cooperation has 
decreased due to the increased availability of other providers, the maturing domestic 
space sectors, and the committed drive toward technological independence. This thesis 
suggests the formulation of an approach that considers the identified hindrances, the 
strength of the American commercial sector, the value of multi-lateral organizations, and 
mostly, the strategic value of cooperative projects in advancing U.S. interests.    
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II. THE PERUVIAN SPACE PROGRAM AND THE 
ACQUISITION OF PERÚSAT-1 
The earliest Peruvian efforts to acquire space capabilities can be traced to Pedro 
Paulet’s early experiments with liquid rocket engines in the late 1800s.67 Although 
Paulet’s efforts did not materialize into direct capabilities, he is credited for having 
conceived some of the earliest rocket engine designs and more distinctly, for pioneering 
the Peruvian Air Force (FAP).68 The official birth of the Peruvian Space Program 
occurred through the establishment of the National Commission of Aerospace Research 
and Development (Comisión Nacional de Investigacion y Desarrollo Aeroespacial 
[CONIDA]) in 1974.69 Since its creation, CONIDA has taken a lead role in space-related 
efforts, which have included sounding rockets and microsatellite projects.70  
The research timeline of the acquisition of PerúSAT-1 begins in 2006 and 
encompasses the administrations of Presidents Toledo, Garcia, and Humala. These 
administrations enjoyed a relatively peaceful, stable, and economically prosperous time, 
thanks to the initiatives established during the presidency of Alberto Fujimori.71  
President Alberto Fujimori came to power in 1990 and since the beginning 
recognized the necessity of maintaining favorable Peru–U.S. relations and immediately 
focused on issues of importance to Washington such as combating drug production and 
trafficking.72 Fujimori understood that the drug and domestic terrorism problem that Peru 
faced necessitated advances in other sectors not just militarily; therefore, he sought to 
promote economic growth through stronger relations with the U.S. and other regional 
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integration efforts.73 Although Fujimori’s rule was considered democratically weak, 
especially after his self-inflicted coup and accusations of human rights abuses, it 
managed the Peru-Ecuador conflict, the fight against Sendero Luminoso and the 
Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) guerrilla-terrorist movement, and 
left Peru in a more favorable economic posture.74 The following administrations built on 
Fujimori’s economic and foreign policy legacy, which would eventually make the 
PerúSAT-1 acquisition possible. 
A. THE EFFORT BEGINS–PRESIDENT ALEJANDRO TOLEDO 
Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006) was the first Peruvian president of indigenous 
descent. In spite of his heritage, Toledo’s U.S. Ivy league education and promotion of 
“orthodox business practices and free market reforms”75 strengthened Peru’s relations 
with Washington. The Bush administration “embraced the Peruvian approach in areas 
like the promotion of democracy, human rights, and free trade at a time when populist, 
socialist regimes in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela increasingly offered alternatives 
unwelcome in Washington.”76 During the Toledo administration, Peru received U.S. 
military and economic aid at an average of $136 and $155 million per year 
respectively.77The combined effects of economic aid and assertive reforms allowed 
Peru’s economy to grow an average of 4.85%.78 Even though Toledo was committed to 
arms reduction, with defense spending averaging only $930 million per year,79 his 
administration began the shift in priorities in regard to space.  
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The administration of President Toledo strengthening Peru’s posture in the 
international arena by forging economic, and technologically favorable relationships with 
its Latin American neighbors, Europe, and Asia-Pacific.80 In 2003, Toledo met with 
President Lula da Silva and “negotiated Peruvian access to two surveillance systems 
Brazil was developing in the Amazon Basin to provide meteorological data and real-time 
information on illegal activities, including drug trafficking and illicit deforestation.”81 In 
2005, Peru became the only Latin American country in the “Chinese-led Asia-Pacific 
Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO).”82 By joining APSCO, Peru would be able to 
access imagery data from a multi-mission constellation of satellites.83 These partnerships, 
in addition to domestic efforts to construct mini-remote sensing satellites84 signaled 
Peru’s interest in remote sensing. The interest was officially confirmed during the last 
month of the Toledo administration through Law 28799.  
President Toledo signed Law 28799 on 19 July 2006, officially declaring the 
country’s national interest in the creation, implementation, and development of a 
National Satellite Imaging Operations Center (Centro Nacional de Operaciones de 
Imágenes Satelitales [CNOIS]).85 This law institutionalized the efforts toward remote 
sensing, highlighting the importance of this specific space capability to the Peruvian 
government. The establishment of CNOIS was followed by a pre-feasibility study 
conducted by CONIDA to evaluate how to best fulfill the new law. Historically, the 
Peruvian government relied on French and American imaging companies for data. But 
now, thanks to Law 28799, CONIDA could venture into finding ways to decrease this 
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dependency. The concept of a satellite receiving station was the most economical option 
and would allow the prompt delivery of requested data. However, the prospects of 
owning an imaging satellite, in addition to a receiving station, were more attractive due to 
financial, operational, and privacy issues. Peru paid approximately $20 per square 
kilometer for images, which were not readily available and were scrutinized by foreign 
entities before they were delivered to the Peruvian government.86 Owning a satellite 
could grant the Peruvian government full agency and privacy with regard to captured 
imagery data.  
The administration of President Toledo officially began the efforts to acquire the 
PerúSAT-1 by signing Law 28799, but due to the high monetary value and the 
acquisition, the way ahead had to be carefully evaluated.  
B. EVALUATING OPTIONS–PRESIDENT ALAN GARCIA 
By the end of the Toledo administration, the desired space capabilities were 
clearly evident. The pre-feasibility study, completed in 2007, the first year of the Garcia 
administration, confirmed the benefits of a satellite imaging receiving station but 
discarded the possibility of owning a satellite due to financial reasons. This determination 
changed, as CONIDA was made aware of the viability of owning a mini-satellite instead 
of one like those evaluated in the pre-feasibility study. This opened up new possibilities 
that had to be researched and therefore CONIDA conducted a follow-on feasibility study 
where once more, considered the possibilities of owning a satellite.  
In the meantime, President Alan Garcia (2006–2011) continued to support his 
predecessors’ market-friendly policies and fully embraced the U.S.-Peru free trade 
agreement established by the previous administration. Garcia did not have the same level 
of relationship with Washington that President Toledo. In fact was during his first term, 
Garcia was considered a persona non grata, but during his second term he conducted 
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multiple White House visits.87 Despite his past, Garcia evaded the left-leaning influences 
and kept his distance from Chavez and Morales, who publicly criticized has adherence to 
neoliberalism and support for the U.S.88  He also strengthened Peru’s relation with 
Europe by establishing a free trade association.89 Even though U.S. military and 
economic aid decreased to an average of $73 and $96 million per year respectively,90 the 
Garcia administration managed to achieve an average economic growth of 6.8%,91 which 
allowed for a military spending to increase from an average of $930 million to $1.6 
billion per year.92   
President Garcia also continued to the focus on Amazon and border security. In 
2008, Garcia visited Brazil and signed 12 new accords to include technological and 
Amazon security cooperation.93 The security concerns with the Amazon territory 
facilitated the establishment of a tripartite memorandum of understanding aimed at 
combating narco-trafficking with Brazil and Colombia.94  
The Amazon and border security efforts accentuated the need for domestic remote 
sensing capabilities and contributed to the determination in 2010 that acquiring an 
imaging satellite was the most appropriate course of action for the Peruvian 
government.95 This decision meant that Peru would officially pursue acquiring an 
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should have its own satellite] Report Perú (blog), February 25, 2010, 
https://reportperu.wordpress.com/2010/02/25/conida-propone-satelite-propio-para-el-peru/. 
 28 
imaging satellite in addition to its data receiving station.96 The action reinforced the 
vision established in the first version of Peru’s national space plan: “without science and 
technology the country cannot achieve development and without development there is no 
security.”97 It is important to note that as soon as this announcement became public, 
potential providers increased their engagement with Peru. On September 2010, the 
United Kingdom Space Agency (UKSA) and CONIDA signed a memorandum of 
agreement,98 followed by a security and defense cooperation agreement in 2013.99 Spain 
also pursues its own agreement while at the same time offering a satellite sharing deal 
through which Peru could access imagery data from a future planned remote sensing 
Spanish constellation.100 Other Japanese, Russian, Israeli, Chinese, and Italian aerospace 
companies voiced their interest in bidding for this project,101 although the acquisition 
effort would fall on the next administration. 
C. PERÚSAT-1, A REALITY–PRESIDENT OLLANTA HUMALA 
President Ollanta Humala Tasso (2011–2016) continued the trend set by the 
previous administrations with focused efforts on investment, education, and the military. 
He aggressively pursued trade partnerships around the world and by the end of his term; 
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99 Infodefensa, “Perú firma un acuerdo de cooperación en Defensa con Reino Unido e Irlanda del Norte 
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Peru had free trade agreements with South Korea, Japan, and was a member of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP). President Humala’s history of military service made him 
support major upgrades to the Peruvian armed forces.102 It is not coincidence that during 
Humala’s term, Peru’s military spending averaged $2.7 billion per year,103 or that it was 
during his tenure that the goal of acquiring an imaging satellite came to fruition.104 By 
Humala’s presidency, the Peruvian economy had yielded consistent growth at an average 
of 5.5% per year105 and was therefore in a better position to make major investments.  
From an international politics standpoint, President Humala strengthened Peru’s 
relations with the U.S., Russia, China, and neighboring Colombia, Ecuador and Brazil. 
During an official visit to the U.S., President Obama praised Humala’s reliability as a 
partner in the Latin America region.106 The Peru-Russia relations reached heights not 
enjoyed “since the military ruled Peru.”107 President Humala continued its partnership on 
border security with Colombia and Brazil, and finally managed to ratify an agreement 
with Ecuador to reduce transnational crime.108 By the end of 2011, “China surpassed the 
United States as Peru’s main trading partner.”109 In 2015, a Chinese naval hospital 
anchored, for the first time ever at a South American port, in Lima’s port of Callao.110 
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During President Humala’s presidency, the Peruvian government announced its 
revamped efforts to acquire its first satellite.111  The commitment was also illustrated by 
the various university projects that were pursued in parallel, such as the Chasqui-I, “built 
by students at Peru’s National Engineering University.”112 
The official request for proposal (RFP) to acquire PerúSAT-1 was released on 
mid-2013,113 and the actual bids were received in early November. The RFP specified the 
minimum technical requirements (MRT) sought as derived from the previous feasibility 
studies. In addition to the MRTs, CONIDA representatives and other space sector 
development advocates sought the highly desired technology transfer requirements. This 
would allow Peru to build domestic knowledge capacity and a new level of technology 
independence in the aerospace sector. A similar deal was completed when the Peruvian 
government negotiated a $210 million technology transfer agreement with Korean 
Aerospace Industries (KAI) for the purchase of 20 trainer aircraft, which included the 
joint manufacture of four planes domestically.114 However, in the end, this requirement 
was dismissed from the selection process.  
The acquisition was accomplished through a process established by the newly 
created Armed Forces Purchasing Agency (Agencia de Compras de las Fuerzas 
Armadas). Under this process, the preferred method to make international purchases is 
the government-to-government, composed of three phases: preparatory, selection and 
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adjudication, and contract execution phase.115 Four companies submitted proposals, 
including Airbus Defense and Space (France), Israel Aerospace Industries, Deimos Space 
SLU (Spain), and Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. (United Kingdom).116  
Interestingly, U.S. and Chinese bids were absent. While the U.S. absence could be 
explained by the relatively low value of the Peruvian contract, especially considering that 
during the same timeframe, three American firms—Lockheed Martin Space Systems, 
Raytheon Intelligence and Information Systems, and Ball Aerospace & Technologies—
were bidding for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Falcon Eye contract valued at 
$930 million.117 China’s absence raises doubts about its perceived growing influence in 
the region, especially considering Sino-Peruvian economic ties and partnership in 
APSCO. Different national newspapers118 reported Chinese engagements with CONIDA, 
which were apparently unfruitful.  
The selection process culminated on November 2013, and the Peruvian Defense 
Ministry selected Airbus’ offer at a price of $211 million.119 The deal included the 
imaging satellite, launch, ground network, a data processing center, and the necessary 
personnel training, and immediate access to the company’s orbiting remote sensing 
constellation.120  
The PerúSAT-1 satellite reached its designated sun-synchronous orbit by the end 
of 2016 on a contracted Vega launcher from Kourou in French Guiana in the midst of 
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controversy.121 The sole prime contractor and government-to-government acquisition 
used was questioned on grounds of lack of transparency and corruption. Sources 
denounced the selection as being detrimental to Peru’s progress in space since it lacked 
the highly desired technology transfer.122 Additionally, it was presumed that the selection 
process did not follow the established process and that the French proposal was favored 
due to political and personal ties between high functionaries in both governments and 
space agencies.123 The allegations triggered a congressional probe into the specifics of the 
acquisition and involved testimonies from President Humala, his minister of defense, and 
other high-ranking officials involved in the satellite purchase.124 Although the charges 
were not confirmed by the time this document was written, the U.S. State Department 
confirmed that the government-to-government process utilized could have affected the 
ability of American companies to bid for the Peruvian project.125  
In spite of the criticism, the acquisition of PerúSAT-1 can be considered a success 
for Peru. The acquired capability aligned with the goal of attaining independent domestic 
satellite imagery. Peru had been procuring imaging data from foreign providers at a high 
cost and at dictated delivery timelines, and the acquisition of PerúSAT-1 allowed for a 
higher level of operational freedom. Furthermore, PerúSAT-1 sub-meter resolution 
imaging data augmented the two-meter resolution imaging data received from APSCO,126 
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increasing Peru’s overall imaging capabilities. The controversy associated with the 
contract award can be attributed to the developing purchasing process.  
D. ANALYSIS  
The acquisition of Peru’s first imaging satellite provides a few details into the 
factors that could potentially hinder U.S.–Latin American space cooperation. First, the 
process, which commenced in 2006, evolved from an inquiry about the feasibility of 
owning a satellite data receiving station, to an affirmation of an absolute need of owning 
a complete satellite imagery-processing center with its fundamental space component. 
This highlights how long and strenuous these types of projects can become, which would 
require a substantial amount of continuous engagement from interested parties for 
potentially small gains. The companies that made it to the last round of selection engaged 
Peruvian officials through one way or another through a period of almost half a decade.  
Second, cost is a significant factor. The political and economic stability of the 
Toledo, Garcia, and Humala administrations fomented consistent economic growth, and 
therefore allowed for investments into projects such as the acquisition of PerúSAT-1. 
From 2000–2014, the Peruvian economy grew an “average of 5.3 percent annually or 
79.6 percent over the period; the highest collective growth rate in South America and 
second only to Panama for all of Latin America.”127 However, the favorable economic 
conditions may not have been sufficient to justify the purchase of an American system, 
which at that time, cost over three times the amount paid by the Peruvian government to 
its French provider.128 Additionally, American imaging satellite manufacturing 
companies could lack monetary incentives to pursue deals like the Peruvian acquisition in 
light of the overwhelming amount of business they receive from the U.S. government and 
other domestic companies like DigitalGlobe.129 
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Lastly, the newness of the Peruvian acquisition system and the history of 
inconsistencies in awarding contracts could diminish the incentives to engage in 
cooperation efforts. The allegations of lack of transparency and corruption associated 
with the acquisition of PerúSAT-1 raise doubts about engaging Peru as partner. However, 
the controversy surrounding the PerúSAT-1 acquisition will most likely help prevent 
transparency issues with follow-on efforts. 
On the other hand, this case study reveals some valuable factors to consider in 
future cooperation engagements. The Peruvian acquisition of its first imaging satellite 
shows the determined and pragmatic approach used to acquire space capabilities. From 
the beginning, Peru had clear aims and motivations. The diverse geography of the 
Peruvian nation, which includes the high Andes Mountains, coastal desert, and dense 
jungles, made satellite imagery a highly desired capability. The Peruvian government 
understood the value of these capabilities and had already been spending precious 
resources to acquire them through external sources or through partnerships with other 
nations and organizations. The imaging data provided by PerúSAT-1 augmented the data 
acquired through APSCO. Additionally, areas like the “Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro 
River Valleys (VRAEM) [which], according to the United Nations (UN), is the place 
with the most coca crops and laboratories for the production of coca base and cocaine 
hydrochloride (HCl) in the world,”130 made monitoring a security need. By acquiring 
these space capabilities, the Peruvian state could extend its reach into remote areas and to 
wage its fight against drug trafficking, illegal mining, and deforestation, while forging a 
path toward space technology independence.  
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III. THE ARGENTINE SPACE PROGRAM 
The history of the Argentine space program highlights the importance of 
institutional capacity for the establishment of space cooperation projects. Scholars have 
normally divided its development into three major time periods, corresponding with 
major shifts within its tremulous political history: 1960–82, 1982–91, and 1991–present.  
The first time period corresponds to the “Golden Age” of the Argentine space 
program, and is characterized by Teófilo Tabanera’s visionary leadership and cooperative 
operational concept. Unfortunately, domestic politics intervened in the program’s 
development path.  
Argentina’s political history, which includes various military interventions and 
populist influences, created institutional deficiencies in its government. These 
deficiencies were manifested in the Argentine military’s unsanctioned behavior after the 
return of democracy in 1982. The Argentine military pursued ballistic missile capabilities 
in an attempt to make up for its defeat in the Falkland Islands war against the United 
Kingdom. These pursuits caused tension in the international system and hindered existing 
cooperative relationships, especially with the United States.  
Fortunately, the political environment realigned during President Menem’s 
administration, and consequently, the space program flourished. Today, Argentina has 
mature institutions, leads Latin America in domestic satellite manufacturing, and has a 
rapidly developing commercial space sector. The cooperative nature that characterized its 
earlier years re-emerged in full force allowing the successful execution of various 
projects with the U.S. and other partners. Argentine efforts in space, now involve 
cooperation projects with Brazil, Spain, Italy, the European Space Agency (ESA) and 
China.    
A. THE GOLDEN AGE OF THE ARGENTINE SPACE PROGRAM (1960–
1982) 
The Argentine space program was established in the early 1960s through the 
creation of the National Commission for Space Research (Comisión Nacional de 
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Investigaciones Espaciales) or CNIE.131 This institution inherited the ideologies 
established during the presidency of Juan Domingo Perón, which promoted nationalism 
through militarism and domestic technology development.132  
Teófilo M. Tabanera, an illustrate figure and advocate for space science and 
exploration was placed as director by the recently elected, President Arturo Frondizi.133 
President Frondizi had been elected following the ousting of President Perón by a 
military junta and, therefore, his approval for the establishment of the CNIE under 
civilian leadership was a risky move.134 The military remained vigilant and ready to 
remove anyone they believed challenged their interests.  
Tabanera established the Argentine Interplanetary Society (Sociedad Argentina 
Interplanetaria) and, through his advocacy and participation in other space-related 
organizations, he gained admittance to the British Interplanetary Society (BIS). All his 
efforts helped Argentina become a founding member of the International Association of 
Astronautics (IAF).135 It was Tabanera’s prestige that helped him be accepted by the 
military and what kept him in charge of the CNIE after President Frondizi was removed 
from power in 1962.136  
Under Tabanera’s visionary leadership and the watchful auspices of the military, 
the CNIE began work on various projects through domestic and international 
partnerships. During the first three years of the institution, Tabanera arranged 
engagements with important figures of the time, such as Dr. Fridtjof Speer and Dr. Von 
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Braun of the Marshall Space Center of NASA.137 Despite their pressed agendas, both of 
these U.S. officials visited Argentina and gave public talks on space-related subjects, 
such as the “Apollo program and the development of large rockets.”138  
The shared German background of the scientists involved in the U.S. and 
Argentine space programs facilitated their early engagements. Many of Tabanera’s team 
members were German immigrants who arrived in Argentina as a result World War II.139 
Most of them had technical university degrees and experience with aeronautical and 
rocketry projects.140 Upon their arrival in Argentina, they changed their first names and 
began teaching and giving technical conferences.141  
These engagements helped establish a NASA-CNIE Memorandum of 
Understanding though which sounding rocket projects, such as the 1964 ionosphere 
experiments with the National University of Tucuman142 and the Experimental Inter-
American Meteorological Network (EXAMETNET) program,143 were achieved. 
Tabanera also established agreements with various universities to conduct other space-
related research projects.144 The cooperative nature of these early space projects set the 
modus operandi and focus of the early years of the Argentine space program. 
This time period is lauded as Argentina’s golden age of space technology 
development. The CNIE, in conjunction with the Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aérea 
Argentina [FAA]) Institute of Aeronautics and Space Research (Instituto de 
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Investigaciones Aeronáuticas y Espaciales) executed a domestic technology development 
effort that “developed and tested 11 different rocket designs.”145 The rockets were 
launched from the newly created Center of Experimentation and Launch of Self-
propelled Projectiles (Centro de Experimentación y Lanzamientos de Proyectiles 
Autopropulsados), and incrementally reached different altitudes and payload 
capacities.146 Two of the most notable launches involved Orion II and Rigel IV rockets. 
The first launched in April 1967 with a capsule containing a mouse.147 Two years later, a 
joint venture between the FAA and the University of Tucumán and the FAA, launched a 
monkey onboard a Rigel IV rocket.148 These two missions show the progress made in 
launch capabilities and the scientific focus of the space program.   
The Argentine space program flourished in the midst of a political environment 
characterized by the repetitive cycles of “rise, crisis, and disintegration of both civilian 
and military governments…in which each cycle was distinguished from its predecessor 
only by the increased violence and intensity it provoked.”149 In 1966, the Argentine 
military once again took control of the country and would not release it until 1972.150 
Unfortunately, this continuously shifting political environment and the constant 
imposition of the military over civilian-led institutions caused Tabanera to step down 
from CNIE leadership in 1968, and his position was filled by the military.151 This change 
in leadership affected the trajectory of the Argentine space program.  
By the time the military took over leadership of the CNIE, Argentine launch 
capabilities had matured to deliver payloads to an altitude of 500 km, a clear record for 
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the region.152 These achievements allowed the program to set its sights on more 
ambitious objectives. The CNIE’s military leadership was determined to advance its 
launch capabilities through a three-phased program, which aimed to develop a solid-
propellant rocket motor and a guidance system that could deliver a 200 kg payload to low 
orbits.153 The FAA enlisted the help of Consen, a German technology company, and 
together, yielded the Condor I missile as a first prototype.154  
The Condor missile program marked a clear deviation from the peaceful vision 
established by Tabanera almost two decades earlier. Although the missile had dual-use 
technology, CNIE leadership pushed the focus away from scientific missions toward 
militaristic purposes. This militaristic focus would only increase in the following years. 
In 1976, a military junta ousted María Estela Martínez de Perón, ushering in Argentina’s 
National Reorganization Process. During this period, Argentina’s military dictatorship 
aggressively pursued economic and social development at the expense of democracy and 
civil liberties. This period came as a result of continuous political instability created by 
the various existing factions with contradicting agendas, which compelled the 
professionalized military to intervene under the doctrine of national security, resulting in 
a seven-year period of military rule.155  
The military dictatorship promoted the development of the Condor missile under 
FAA leadership, but allowed the relations and vision established by Tabanera to fall to a 
lower priority. The number of scientific missions and engagements with NASA was 
significantly decreased. U.S.-Argentine relations were strained as a consequence of 
Argentina’s Dirty War, where approximately 30,000 citizens were killed,156 and its 
posture regarding nuclear technology proliferation. The new focus advanced the 
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military’s goals but would unfortunately, usher in an epoch of setbacks for the Argentine 
space program.   
As the National Reorganization Process continued, the pressure on the ruling 
junta to show results increased. The various efforts to stimulate the economy and promote 
social development proved unsuccessful, and the military found itself searching for ways 
to legitimize their rule. In their view, taking the Falkland Islands back from Britain was 
the way.  
B. THE INFLUENCE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAR ON THE 
SPACE PROGRAM (1982–1991) 
The Falkland Islands have been at the center of controversy since they were 
discovered. Different nations—to include the British, Spaniards, and French—were 
interested in the islands due to their strategic position in the south Atlantic.157 During 
colonial times, the islands were considered part Spain’s American territories.158After the 
wars of independence, Argentina declared the islands as part of its inherited territory 
from Spain and proceeded to enforce their administration, until 1829 when the British 
removed Argentine settlers.159  
The dispute over the Falkland Islands came to the forefront almost two centuries 
later amid political and economic turmoil. Argentine Army General Leopoldo Galteri 
used his influence with other military branches and gained support for his plan to take the 
Falkland Islands before the 150th anniversary of their British seizure.160 On April 2, 
1982, Argentine commandos landed on the Falkland Islands and seized control, causing 
euphoria in Argentina.161 But the victory was short-lived. Britain responded with a 
28,000 men Naval Task Force that brought the conflict to its end two months later.162 By 
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the end of the conflict, Britain had lost 255 personnel, and eight ships, while Argentina 
incurred 649 personnel loses and significant materiel loses, including the armored cruiser, 
General Belgrano, and big fraction of FAA aircraft.163  
Following the Argentine military’s defeat in the Falkland Islands War with the 
United Kingdom, the Argentine military junta had no choice but to cede power, although 
the formal return of democracy would not occur until the end of the following year, on 
December 1983, when President Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín took office. In the meantime, the 
military remained convinced of the legitimacy of its actions and continued to search for 
ways to make up for the Falkland Islands defeat.  
Merely one month later, a group of 50 FAA officers met during a period of over 
two months to discuss their views on the conflict and to establish plans for the future of 
the Air Force.164 General Ernesto Crespo, the leader of the group, expressed in an 
interview: “We, the FAA, didn’t lose the war, we gave them a good beating.”165 General 
Crespo’s expression encapsulates the predominant belief of the FAA and perhaps, all of 
the Argentine military. In their view, the Falkland Islands defeat occurred due to the 
British technological advantage and access to modern weaponry.166 Argentina had fallen 
prey to its external dependency on weapons providers who cut their supply at the 
escalation of the conflict.167 This hard-learned lesson affirmed the need for domestic 
development of weaponry and military supplies. 
Up to this point, the development of Argentina’s rocket technology had been 
focused on maturing space-launch capabilities. After the Falkland Islands defeat, the 
FAA began its modernization pursuit, which included 36 domestic development projects, 
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including a medium-range ballistic missile based on the Condor I launch vehicle.168 This 
meant that the dual-purpose nature of the envisioned launcher had to be changed to 
purely offensive goals. In order to make the shift possible, the Condor I design was 
changed to include thrust vector control and other upgrades that demanded the 
importation of missile technologies. Even though this effort was counterproductive to the 
originally established vision of domestic technology development, the military’s 
perceived need for strike capabilities that could reach the Falkland Islands outweighed all 
other factors, including financing.  
During the military dictatorship, the defense budget reached peaks equating to 4% 
of Argentina’s GDP. However, this changed when President Alfonsín assumed office. 
The military’s budget suffered in part due to reprisal from the new civilian leadership,169 
but mainly due to the prevailing debt crisis.170 Although the military had gone back to its 
barracks, Alfonsín had to be extremely careful since the “coups were a real concern until 
the end of the decade (including uprising by Army groups in 1987, 1988, and 1990).”171 
Alfonsín’s cautious approach allowed the military to keep a certain level of autonomy. 
The Condor project survived the scrutiny of the new civilian leadership due to its 
perceived dual use, although the funding it received was not sufficient for the 
development timeline established by the military.172 Therefore, the military decided to 
search for creative ways to augment the project’s financing, to include different 
agreements with Middle Eastern countries.173 A funding agreement was established with 
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Egypt and Iraq in exchange for solid-fuel missile technology.174 The funds originated 
from Iraq and were channeled through Egypt to evade international proliferation 
regulations.175 Iraq needed the technology exchange for its own missile development 
program and Argentina was considered a viable partner in this endeavor because it 
received less scrutiny from the United States.176 The relationship between the three 
countries allowed the transfer of 56 solid rocket motors to Egypt,177 which most likely 
made their way to Iraq.178  
The approach taken by the Argentine Air Force to finance the Condor program 
chilled Argentine-U.S. relations further. The external technological and financial support 
received by Argentina raised concerns about missile and nuclear technology proliferation 
and, as a result, both Argentina as a country and its space program suffered under the 
pressures of the international community. The Condor II ballistic missile, with its 1,000 
km range and capacity to carry a 500 kg warhead, violated missile and nuclear 
proliferation regimes.179 Members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
and of the Treaty of Tlatelolco denounced the Argentine technology transfer in exchange 
for financial support.  
More importantly, the relationships established by Tabanera during his tenure as 
head of the CNIE remained on hold during this period and were not reaffirmed until 
President Carlos Menem conclusively terminated the Condor missile program. The shift 
away from the traditionally cooperative and peaceful nature of the Argentine space 
program had hurt its development. This was a sharp contrast to what the region’s most 
promising space player had hoped to accomplish.   
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C. NORMALITY AND PROGRESS (1991–PRESENT) 
The damage suffered by the Argentine space program during the National Reorganization 
Process and under the military’s leadership, began to heal during President Menem’s 
administration. The healing came as a result of Menem’s governance approach, which 
established civilian control over the military, market-oriented reforms, and closer 
adherence to liberal democratic principles.180  
Menem sought to change Argentina’s image in the international community by 
adopting the theory of periphery realism (Realismo Periferico), advanced by Carlos 
Escudé. This theory categorized states into center, periphery, and semi-periphery based 
on realist conceptions of power. Under this theory, the rights and privileges of states 
depended on their category, and incompatible behavior compromised their status in the 
international community.181 President Menem and his foreign minister, Guido Di Tella, 
believed that past actions had placed Argentina in the periphery, and therefore formulated 
an approach that could move them closer to the center.182 Their approach involved 
amending their relations with central powers, such as the United States, which had been 
damaged as a result of past confrontational behavior, such as the development of the 
Condor missile and the proliferation of missile technology.  
The normalization of U.S. relations with regard to space commenced in May 1991 
after Menem signed a presidential decree that dissolved both the CNIE and the Condor 
project.183 The same decree created the National Commission of Space Activities 
(Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales [CONAE]) and placed it under civilian 
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leadership, ushering in a new phase of development for the Argentine space program.184 
The new organization was infused with a $700 million budget.185 The CONAE 
established a satellite-focused space plan program structured to address the needs of six 
user sectors (i.e., emergency management, agriculture, and mining) through an 
information cycle that delivers pertinent data acquired by space assets.186 It also began to 
advance manufacturing capabilities through the establishment of its domestic enterprise 
Applied Research (Investigación Aplicada [INVAP]) and by returning to the cooperative 
approach established by Tabanera.187 The space plan clearly justifies the space program 
as a development tool and established cooperation as one of its most important tenets.188  
The re-established relations with NASA and new relations with other space 
players such as Italy, France, Netherlands, and Brazil, yielded various scientific 
application satellites.189 In 1996, the first of the Satélites de Aplicación Científica 
(Scientific Applications Satellite [SAC]) satellites, SAC-B was launched from 
Vandenberg Air Force Base onboard a Pegasus launch vehicle.190 The SAC-B featured a 
bus that was designed, built, and tested in Argentina.191 It contained a scientific payload 
with four sensors: one Argentine, two from NASA, and one from the Italian Space 
Agency (ASI).192 Even though an anomaly with the launch vehicle prevented the SAC-B 
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satellite from achieving its mission objectives, the project showcased CONAE’s 
technology and integration capabilities.  
Relations between NASA and CONAE gradually strengthened, to allow 
partnerships in unique projects such as the X-33. Argentina became the only Latin 
American participant in this technology demonstrator intended to be a scaled prototype of 
a reusable launch vehicle, designed to “increase reliability [and dramatically] lower the 
cost of [launching payloads] into space.’193 Publicly available documentation does not 
specify CONAE’s role in this mission, but a memorandum of understanding was signed 
in 1997, confirming its participation.194 The strong U.S.–Argentina ties were confirmed 
that same year when the U.S. designated Argentina as a major non-NATO ally.195 Not 
even a decade had passed since President Menem turned toward normalization, but 
amazingly, relations between the two nations had significantly strengthened.  
The NASA–CONAE partnership continued the SAC series effort and, in 1998, the 
SAC-A microsatellite was launched as a secondary payload aboard the U.S. space shuttle. 
This satellite was built as a technology test-bed for future systems and featured an 
Argentine sun sensor, deployment mechanism, and momentum wheel.196 The SAC-A 
reached its operating location successfully and began providing environmental 
panchromatic data, and proved the telemetry, command, and control infrastructure of 
CONAE’s satellite control stations, as well as the operational capability of its 
personnel.197 
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Further cooperation with the U.S., Brazil, Denmark, France, and Italy produced 
the SAC-C satellite, which launched in 2000.198 The SAC-C was Argentina’s first earth 
observation satellite, built to image its territory, capture environmental data for the study 
of land and maritime ecosystems, and detect desertification processes in the Patagonia 
region.199 The SAC series continued with the SAC-D/Aquarius satellite, launched in 
2011.200 For this mission, CONAE provided the bus and NASA a scientific payload 
designed to measure “ocean salinity, and provide insights into how the ocean, atmosphere 
and sea ice influences circulation, weather and climate.”201  
The satellites from the SAC series showcased CONAE’s maturing technology and 
integration capabilities, achieved in no small part thanks to its cooperation with the U.S. 
and other partners. Its main provider, INVAP, achieved a level of expertise that allowed 
it to lend its services to Argentine Satellite Solutions Company (Empresa Argentina de 
Soluciones Satelitales [AR-SAT]) for the development of the first GEO satellite designed 
and built in entirely in Latin America, the ARSAT-1 communications satellite.202 The 
ARSAT-1 was launched into GEO orbit successfully in 2014 aboard an Ariane 5 launched 
vehicle, followed by ARSAT-2 the next year.203   
In addition to scientific and GEO communications satellites, INVAP ventured 
into the commercial space sector through its partnership with Argentina’s Satellogic 
company and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Productive Innovation (Ministerio 
de Ciencia, Technolgía e Innovación Productiva [MINCYT]). Satellogic was founded in 
2010 by Emiliano Kargieman with the vision of “democratizing space” by providing 
cost-effective space solutions through the design, construction, and operation of Nano 
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satellites.204 Satellogic established its foothold in 2013 when it launched its first satellite 
CubeBug with the help of MINCYT funding and INVAP’s technical expertise.205 By the 
end of the same year, its second Nano satellite, Manolito was launched.206 In 2014, the 
company received funding from a Uruguayan investment firm, allowing the expansion of 
its operations into Uruguay.207 The expansion allowed Satellogic to benefit from 
favorable import/export logistics and an educated workforce, resulting in the production 
of Uruguay’s first satellites, ÑuSat-1 (Fresco) and ÑuSat-2 (Batata).208 Fresco and 
Batata were launched on 2016 and became the first members of the Aleph commercial 
imaging constellation. In March 2017, the Aleph constellation allowed Satellogic to 
become the sole commercial provider of high-frequency hyper-spectral imagery in the 
world.209 These achievements highlight the progress of the Argentine commercial space 
sector. 
It is important to note that despite the turmoil caused in 2001 over Argentina’s 
debt default, its re-established space-related relations remained consistent, even during 
both Kirchner administrations when the anti-American rhetoric used suggested mis-
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alignment.210 Since the return of democracy, the Argentine government has made 
consistent progress to amend the mistakes of the past. The pattern of confidence-building 
measures that began with President Menem has continued to allow the re-emergence of 
what otherwise would have been considered controversial: Argentina’s space launch 
vehicle development. The Tronador project emerged in 2007 under the auspices of 
CONAE through the creation of the state-owned enterprise, New Generation Space 
Vehicle (Vehículo Espacial Nueva Generación [VENG]).211 Although the project has yet 
to involve U.S. participation, it maintains a cooperative nature by engaging other partners 
such as Brazil. More importantly, it has upheld the requirements of the MTCR.  
Another potentially controversial project involved the installation of a Chinese 
deep-space antenna in Argentina’s Patagonia region.212 The project was established on 
2014 by President Cristina Kirchner, allowing the tax-exempt construction and operation 
of the tracking station in exchange for 10% usage by CONAE.213 The agreement caught 
the attention of domestic and international media due to its perceived ideological 
motivation, considering the nature of the Kirchner administration. However, the 
agreement was a calculated move that will ensure Argentine participation in 
interplanetary exploration projects. A similar agreement was established with the ESA, 
allowing the construction and operation of a similar station in the Mendoza province.214 
This last station served as a backup during the final phase of the Cassini mission, 
allowing Argentine participation in a significant deep-space exploration project.215  
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Argentina is unquestionably Latin America’s leader in satellite manufacturing. 
CONAE has acquired a solid track record of success in its cooperation ventures with the 
U.S. and other international partners. Currently, CONAE is working on delivering two 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) Observation & Communications Satellites (SAOCOM), 
which are part of an agreement with ASI to join the European COSMO-SkyMed 
constellation.216 The Italian constellation, made up of four SAR satellites, will be 
augmented by the Argentine SAOCOM satellites to create the Argentine-Italian Satellite 
System for Emergency Management (Sistema Ítalo-Argentino de Satélites para la 
Gestión de Emergencias [SIASGE]).217 Once operational, SIASGE will add to 
Argentina’s contribution to the international disasters charter, which it became a member 
of in 2003 after the launch of SAC-C.218  
Other Argentine space cooperation projects include the Cooperation Española-
Argentina (CESAR) mission with Spain, and the Argentina Brazilian Satellite for Ocean 
Information (Satélite Argentino Brasileño para Información del Mar [SABIA-Mar]) 
mission with Brazil. The CESAR mission is remote sensing project designed as follow-
on to the Argentine SAC and the Spanish Minisat programs, with the primary purpose of 
attaining the space imagery capability through cost sharing.219 SABIA-Mar is an earth 
observation project designed to gather ocean imagery data for resource management and 
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the study climate change.220 CONAE’s current projects maintain a scientific focus and 
make cooperation a priority.  
INVAP has amassed significant technical expertise in the manufacture of 
scientific satellites and is building the Argentine commercial space sector through its 
partnership with companies like Satellogic. CONAE has been effective and consistent at 
tracing and following its development plans, understands the advantages of cooperation, 
and is well positioned to exert its targeted regional leadership and fulfill the vision 
established during the early years of the Argentine space program.   
D. ANALYSIS  
The history of the Argentine space program highlights the importance and 
strategic value of space cooperation. Tabanera’s visionary leadership established the 
peaceful and cooperative nature of the program. Even though the program remained 
under the scrutiny of the military during its early years, it managed to develop domestic 
expertise in sounding rocket technology through its cooperative projects.    
The Falkland Islands war and the militaristic trends of National Reorganization 
Process caused a dramatic halt to these developments by shifting the focus toward 
militarism. After the Falkland Islands war, changes were made in order to achieve 
military capabilities that could help amend the Argentine defeat against the United 
Kingdom. Nevertheless, the institutional immaturity and prevailing structural forces of 
the post-dictatorship years allowed for unsanctioned behavior by the Argentine 
government in the eyes of the international community. The U.S. and the international 
community placed pressure on Argentina to cease the development of the Condor 
medium-range ballistic missile and halted their engagement in space-related activities 
until the program was canceled. 
After the cancellation of the Condor program, Argentine politics and confidence-
building measures allowed for the thawing of relations with the U.S. and for the 
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establishment of new partnerships with other space players. The pressure to cancel the 
Condor program was compensated for by scientific cooperative projects that yielded the 
SAC series satellites and a range of domestic manufacturing capabilities.221 Since then, 
INVAP has become a major satellite manufacturer with technical and space systems 
integration capacity to build scientific, GEO, and Nano satellites. This expertise has 
allowed companies like Satellogic to establish a foothold in the commercial satellite 
imaging industry and to export its services to other countries in the region. 
Although there are various hypotheses of where the Argentine space program 
would be today if the Condor program would had continued, its current success outshines 
them all. Today, Argentina is unquestionably the region’s leader in satellite 
manufacturing. It has overcome its setbacks and has achieved technical and manpower 
capacity to accomplish complex projects and exert regional leadership. It has revived its 
space launch program and upholds the non-proliferation regime’s requirements. The 
forced cancellation of the Condor was hard a hard pill to swallow. However, current 
Argentine literature praises the consistent stance taken by the U.S. throughout its shifting 
political history.222 It is understood that the Condor’s technology did not have a place in a 
state with the institutional capacity that Argentina had in the late 1970–1980s.223   
The success of the Argentine space program is owed in large part to its relations 
with the U.S. The relations between both countries have endured ups and downs, but 
today they are deeply appreciated by both sides..224 Argentina has a promising space 
program and the U.S. has a reliable partner in space. 
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IV. THE SPACE PROGRAM OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC 
OF VENEZUELA 
By most standards, 2017 can be considered a bad year for Venezuela. Its 
economic situation was alarming: inflation at 536.2 percent,225 a foreign debt surpassing 
$150 billion,226 and oil production decreasing at 20 thousand barrels per day.227 On the 
political front, things were not any better. The non-existent checks and balances in the 
branches of government allowed the Supreme Court to overstep the bounds of the 
legislature in an effort to solidify the existing regime.228 Despite vast unpopularity and 
criticism, President Nicolás Maduro—a man who “has told the nation that a little bird 
speaks to him, bringing him news of Chávez from the afterlife”229—cemented his grip on 
power.    
Surprisingly, this same year, Venezuela’s third Chinese-built, multi-million dollar 
satellite, was placed into orbit by a Long March 2D launch vehicle. The puzzling and 
perhaps even irrational fact that Venezuela could accomplish such a feat is explained by 
recognizing the significant role that its space program has played in advancing domestic 
and foreign policy objectives.  
The Venezuelan space program was established as a social and economic 
development tool, claiming to follow the Indian space program model.230 However, over 
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the last decade, the Chavez and Maduro regimes have used it as a means to advance the 
ideals of the Bolivarian revolution. This idealist movement sought to promote twenty-
first century socialism, strengthen national sovereignty, promote a multipolar world 
order, and advance regional integration.231 These ideals are implanted in the mission and 
vision of the space program and set the criteria for establishing cooperative projects.  
The Bolivarian revolution, which commenced on 1999 with Chavez’s rise to 
power, turned Venezuela into the emblematic case of Latin America’s recent left turn 
through its influence on every aspect of society. History shows that the Venezuelan space 
program did not escape its grip.  
A. THE ANDEAN PACT COUNTRIES AND PRE-CHAVEZ APPROACH TO 
SPACE 
The earliest Venezuelan efforts to obtain space capabilities date back to the 
1970s, when it formed part of the Andean Pact countries [Comunidad Andina de 
Naciones (CAN)], along with Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.232 The shared 
geographic challenges that these Andean nations faced motivated the joint pursuit of a 
GEO telecommunications satellite project, originally called Project Cóndor.233  
The high costs associated with space technology and the lack of regional expertise 
drove the CAN to approach Project Cóndor very pragmatically. The project was 
established only after two feasibility studies were conducted: first by the Chilean firm 
ENTEL-Chile and later by the European company, ESCO.234 These studies were 
carefully scrutinized and, although the feasibility of the project was conclusively 
affirmed, little progress was made for almost two decades.     
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By 1990, Venezuela played such a leadership role that the project was renamed 
Satélite Simón Bolívar, the name of Venezuela’s independence leader.235 Venezuelan 
representatives encouraged technical rigor and supported fair and open bidding for the 
award of technical advising services.236 In 1995, the committee of participating nations 
and their corresponding commercial firms, competitively selected telecommunications 
company, ANDESAT S.A. to carry out the project.237  
Ultimately, ANDESAT S.A. failed to meet expectations and therefore, project 
Simón Bolivar never materialized. In 2006, Chavez withdrew from the CAN in protest 
over Colombia and Peru’s relations with the U.S. and their commitment to neoliberal 
economic policies.238 The pragmatic approach that had earned its prior leadership 
position was abandoned in favor of advancing the ideals of the Bolivarian revolution.  
B. THE RISE OF HUGO CHAVEZ AND THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION 
The study of the Venezuelan space program cannot be separated from the context 
of Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution. Chavez was an idealist military officer who felt 
his country had abandoned the ideals of its founding father, Simón Bolívar.239 During the 
1980s, he was involved in a clandestine organization called Revolutionary Bolivarian 
Movement 200 (MBR 200), formed mostly by members of the military who shared 
nationalist ideas about the future of Venezuela. They believed in raising Venezuela from 
its current state into a developed country by focusing on the nurturing of an arms and 
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capital goods industries and a strong military.240 They sought “the recovery of patriotic 
values, to dignify the military career, and fight against corruption.”241  
The MBR 200 became public in 1992 after its failed attempt to overthrow 
President Carlos Andrés Pérez through a military coup.242 Although the failed coup only 
managed to land MBR 200 members in prison, it brought the revolutionary character of 
Hugo Chavez into the spotlight. Once pardoned and freed by President Rafael Caldera, 
the MBR 200 members went on to form the Fifth Republic Movement and placed Chavez 
at the forefront.243  
During this time, Venezuelans had become frustrated with their government’s 
inability to create economic stability and, therefore, welcomed Chavez as a breath of 
fresh air. The governing elites had turned to neoliberal free market reforms to counteract 
the effects of low oil prices and the failures of import substitution industrialization, but 
only managed to increase discontent.244 In this context, Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution 
gained enough momentum to win the 1998 presidential elections with 56.2 percent of the 
vote, the most decisive victory since 1947.245  
Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution gained strength with the progression of his time in 
office. The Venezuelan space program became an additional tool to advance Chavez’s 
ideology-driven political objectives.  
C. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION 
AND SPACE ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA 
The institutionalization of space activities in Venezuela began with the ratification 
of the 1999 constitution, during Chavez’s first term in office. The new constitution was 
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Chavez’s delivery on his campaign promise to replace the “moribund and unjust” 1961 
version, with one that favored the people, assured national sovereignty and promoted 
social justice.”246 The document was drafted by a Constituent Assembly composed in its 
majority by Chavez supporters, allowing the inclusion of provision that advanced the 
Bolivarian revolution.247 It centralized power in the presidency and institutionalized 
participative and protagonist democratic principles through the creation of two additional 
branches of government: the National Electoral Council and Citizen Power.248 It 
reaffirmed state ownership of oil resources and the role of the state in guaranteeing civil 
rights and managing the economy.249 In international affairs, it promoted the 
democratization of the world order and Latin American integration.250 The constitution 
allowed Chavez to adjust the regulatory powers of the branches of government, creating 
maneuvering room to advance his political objectives. 
The affirmations of the new constitution were followed by immediate actions. 
Chavez began to work on oil reform and the negotiation of favorable oil prices with the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The negotiations yielded 
favorable results and, within a few months, oil prices tripled251 in spite of opposition from 
state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) executives.  
The statements about national sovereignty were enforced by actions that restricted 
access to Venezuela. Chavez denied over-flights by U.S. aircraft engaged in counter-
narcotics operations.252 He canceled Venezuela’s International Military Education and 
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Training (IMET) agreement with the United States and even rejected offers for 
environmental disaster assistance following a series of catastrophic landslides.253  
The statements about democratization of the world order were followed by 
actions to diversify Venezuela’s international relations and to promote a multipolar 
international system. Chavez idealism drew from Simon Bolivar’s anti-colonial ideals to 
invoke anti-imperialism.254 In support of this effort, Chavez toured Latin American 
countries, Western Europe, and Asia, signing several trade agreements.255 In a speech in 
China he stated, “Venezuela was beginning to ‘stand up’ for its rights, arguing that ‘this 
world cannot be run by a universal police force that seeks to control everything.’”256 
These statements were only a preview of the anti-American rhetoric that characterized the 
Chavez regime.  
The 1999 constitution cemented the ideals of the Bolivarian revolution into every 
aspect of Venezuelan society, including its space program. The “sovereignty” and 
“democratization” themes are echoed in Article 11, which recognizes Venezuela’s 
sovereign right to access outer space.257 It also dictated the approach taken by the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, the institution created to advance Venezuelan 
efforts in space. The Ministry of Science and Technology created a commission that 
mirrored Chavez’s diversification approach to international affairs. From the time it was 
established, the commission explored potential space partnerships with countries such as 
China, India, and Russia258 in order to diversify Venezuela’s technology providers. In 
2004, Chavez took the commission’s actions a step further and enticed China into signing 
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a space cooperation agreement that resulted in the acquisition of VeneSat-1, Venezuela’s 
first satellite.259  
D. THE RADICALIZATION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION AND 
THE ACQUISITION OF VENESAT-1  
The Sino-Venezuelan space cooperation agreement that led to the acquisition of 
the VeneSat-1 satellite was established at the peak of a highly charged political 
environment. Chavez succeeded in creating the 1999 constitution and in facilitating the 
victory of his political allies in the 2000 “mega-elections,”260 where all the Venezuelan 
offices were renewed. In response, the opposition began a charge that only exacerbated 
the aggressiveness with which Chavez pushed the ideals of his Bolivarian revolution. On 
April 2002, Chavez was temporarily removed from power through a military coup.261 
However, his supporters came to the rescue and reinstated him almost immediately. The 
temporary ouster reinvigorated Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution and, as a result, his 
policies became more aggressive.  
On the domestic side, Chavez went after the PDVSA executives who refused to 
back his oil reform and had promoted a work stoppage.262 Chavez’s dealings PDVSA 
became confrontational and resulted in the dismissal of 18,000 employees, including high 
and medium-level executives.263 This action would later be identified as one of the main 
causes behind the decreasing oil production. Chavez also ordered the centralized 
management of resources and the creation of a presidential fund for discretionary 
spending.264 Declarations by the ministry of finance indicate that the president’s fund 
included PDVSA contributions of approximately $4.5 billion, which equaled 3% of 
Venezuela’s GDP.265  
                                                 
259 Delgado-López, “Sino-Latin American Space Cooperation,” 10. 
260 Coppedge, “Venezuela, Popular Sovereignty versus Liberal Democracy,” 168. 
261 López-Maya, “Chapter 9,” 222. 
262 López-Maya, 222. 
263 López-Maya, 222. 
264 López-Maya, 224. 
265 López-Maya, 224. 
 60 
International policy also became more aggressive. Chavez increased his 
inflammatory rhetoric against the U.S., which he blamed for the attempted coup.266 He 
publicly described President Bush as being a donkey, a fool, and even alluded he was the 
devil by making a comment about the sulfurous smell Bush had apparently left after 
speaking at the United Nations podium.267 Friction with the U.S. reached such a level that 
Chavez threatened to send some of his F-16 aircraft to China and Cuba as a protest for 
not being able to receive spare U.S. parts.268 He also increased the ideological rhetoric of 
the Bolivarian revolution and publicly proclaimed the ideals of twenty-first century 
socialism at a solidarity meeting in Caracas.269  
Further actions in the international arena included Chavez’s consistent attempts to 
warm up to China. Chavez is reported to have “courted China hard”270 in his effort to 
align with whom he considered to be the key U.S. rival in the international system.271 He 
described his Bolivarian revolution “as being rooted in the ideology of Communist 
China’s founder, Mao Zedong.”272 This courting resulted in increased ties between the 
two countries through a series of agreements aimed at diversifying Venezuelan import 
and export markets. By 2004, trade had nearly quadrupled, and China was given 
preferential access to Venezuela’s oil and gas resources.273 Chavez stated that China 
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270 Jorge I. Domínguez, “China’s Relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes,” 
Working Paper (Inter-American Dialogue, June 2006), 41, http://www.offnews.info/downloads/china-
latam.pdf. 
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273 Illera, “La Política Exterior de Chávez: Proyección de la Revolución Bolivariana en las Relaciones 
Internacionales,” [Chavez's foreign policy: projecting the Bolivarian revolution in international relations] 
223. 
 61 
deserved his support since it had demonstrated a friendly and non-imperialist approach 
toward Latin America.274 He even went as far as to declare that Bolivar and Mao were 
soulmates. 
Moreover, China’s space program gained entrance into the Latin American 
market. Chavez’s 2004 agreement was followed by an official contract award the 
following year. China’s Great Wall Industry Corporation (GWIC) was contracted for the 
design, manufacture, development, testing and launch of VeneSat-1 (renamed Simón 
Bolívar).275 The decision was reached after a reported assessment of Russian, European, 
and Indian proposals.276 The deal was signed by the newly created Venezuelan Space 
Center (Centro Espacial Venezolano [CEV]) and included a ground segment and 
personnel training for a total cost of $406 million.277 According to the CEV, the 
agreement was done “the Bolivarian way,” which meant it considered the social and 
cultural context in order to break Venezuela’s foreign technology dependence.278 The 
geopolitical benefits of the Chinese offer aligned with the “Bolivarian” approach to space 
cooperation and with Chavez’s political goals. However, the availability of similar 
systems with a smaller price tag, such as Brazil’s Embratel Star One C2 satellite at $150 
million, suggests that politics trumped technical decisions.279 Especially considering the 
technical maturity of the acquired system.  
The Venesat-1 was the second exported satellite built using GWIC’s new Dong 
Fang Hong 4 (DFH-4) platform.280 The DFH-4 platform was designed as an upgrade to 
the DFH-3 in an attempt to match the capacities of Western variants, such as the 
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Spacebus 3000 and Boeing 702.281 The first DFH-4 satellite, Sinosat-2, was launched on 
October 2006 with an expected mission life of 15 years, but failed within 15 hours of 
achieving its designed orbit.282 Similarly, Nigcomsat, which was launched on May 2007, 
failed within 18 months.283 The Venezuelan deal helped amend these two setbacks and 
contributed to more GWIC contract wins, although a lot of them were won thanks to the 
complete package deal offered, which included the space and ground segment, training, 
and full financing by Chinese banks.284  
The establishment of the Sino-Venezuela space cooperation agreement cemented 
the acquisition of Venesat-1 but also advanced the ideals of Chavez’s Bolivarian 
revolution. In Chavez’s view, his partnership with the Chinese allowed the promotion of 
a multipolar world order and set Venezuela on a path toward technological independence. 
The project would prove to pay further dividends after its launch in 2008, during 
Chavez’s second term in office.   
E. CHAVEZ’S SECOND TERM (2007–2012): THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION 
By the beginning of Chavez’s second term, the political, social, and economic 
conditions were set for the further expansion of the Bolivarian revolution. The political 
conditions were set through the replacement of the 1961 constitution with the 1999 
version. The new constitution centralized power in the executive and removed the checks 
and balances that characterize a liberal democracy.285 It substituted the bicameral 
legislative branch with a unicameral National Assembly with the power to grant decree 
powers to the executive.286 The executive could, in turn, dissolve the National Assembly. 
The judiciary and legislative branches were shuffled until they had the desired mix of 
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Chavez supporters.287All branches of the military were unified under one command and 
were given charge over their promotions and responsibility for the maintenance of public 
order, participation in national development, and domestic policing.288 By the end of 
Chavez’s first term, the institutions necessary for liberal democracy were there, but they 
were useless, since they were unable to serve as a check on each other due to their shared 
agenda.289  
The social and economic conditions were set by favorable oil prices. The 
expended effort to establish favorable oil prices paid off, resulting on an uptick in the 
economy that allowed Chavez to increase expenditures on various social programs.290 As 
a result, poverty and extreme poverty indexes began to fall.291 Venezuelans welcomed the 
changes even though the programs were financed solely by oil rents. Central Bank data 
shows that in 2006, 89% of Venezuelan exports were attributed to oil.292 Nevertheless, 
the relatively favorable social and economic conditions reflected positively on Chavez, 
allowing him to win the presidency for six more years.  
Chavez interpreted his victory at the voting booth as approval for the 
advancement of his Bolivarian revolution. Following his inauguration, Chavez gave a 
series of speeches where he laid out the plan to implement twenty-first century communal 
socialist state. He announced the five tools he needed to implement his plan: Enabling 
Law; constitutional reform; the demolition of individualism, capitalism, and egotism; the 
distribution of political, economic, social, and military power in accordance with socialist 
principles; and the creation of means to channel popular power.293 
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However, to Chavez’s surprise, Venezuelans did not stand behind his plan. The 
proposed constitutional reform was rejected at the voting booth on December 2007.294 
The defeat strengthen the opposition and shed light on enduring problems, such as rising 
inflation and the shortage of basic products.295 It also made Chavez and his supporters 
search for ways to continue legitimizing their regime. Venezuela’s space program was 
one of those ways.  
By this time, Venezuelan space activities had been formalized beyond mere 
ministerial commissions, through the creation of an actual space agency. The National 
Assembly approved the creation of the Bolivarian Agency for Space Activities (Agencia 
Bolivariana para las Actividades Espaciales [ABAE]) on 9 August 2007,296 just in time 
for the launch of its first satellite.  
The acquisition of Venesat-1 from China turned Venezuela into the region’s fifth 
spacefaring country, but also gave Chavez a platform to continue the promotion of his 
Bolivarian revolution. The satellite was launched on 29 October 2008, from Xichang 
Satellite Launch Center onboard a CZ-3B Chang Sheng-3B launch vehicle, and was 
placed on the 78 degree W. geostationary orbital position.297 This orbital position was 
originally procured by Uruguay for the placement of its first satellite, but resource 
problems prevented the realization of the project. Venezuelan space and Uruguayan space 
authorities reached an agreement that allowed Venesat-1 to utilize the orbital slot in 
exchange for 10% of its payload capacity.298   
Following its launch in 2008, Chavez boasted publicly that the Venesat-1 was a 
“satellite for freedom, [and] part of a drive for independence from the monopoly of 
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satellite communication by the United States.”299 He asserted that Venezuela could now 
counter U.S. “media bombardment…construct socialism…and illuminate Venezuela’s 
technological illiteracy.”300  
Venesat-1 bandwidth was allocated to support Chavez’s Telesur television 
network and Villa Del Cine film studio.301 The new space capability helped Chavez 
advance his effort to control communications. This effort began in 2007 when Chavez 
forced the closure of Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV), the network used by the 
opposition to relay anti-Chavez media.302  
Chavez’s weekly television show, Alo Presidente, switched its transmission from 
contracted bandwidth to Venesat-1. The change is reported to have been troublesome due 
to the technical problems experienced during the satellite’s first three years in orbit.303 
Nevertheless, the new capability allowed Chavez to broadcast his Bolivarian revolution 
message throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, and rally support for other 
regional integration initiatives such as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas 
(ALBA) and Petrosur.  
In a less rhetorical sense, Venesat-1 allowed the implementation of telemedicine, 
tele-education, and remote communication social programs.304 These programs portrayed 
the Chavez regime as the salvation of the poor and underprivileged, and therefore still 
managed to contribute to the advance of the Bolivarian revolution.  
Indeed, Venezuela’s space program allowed Chavez to sway attention away from 
his administration’s domestic failures. However, by 2009, the effects of the 2008 
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financial crisis were felt by Venezuela’s oil-dependent economy. In 2010, the Central 
Bank reported an economy in recession with an increasing inflation rate.305 In reaction, 
the Chavez regime expanded its control over the economy, nationalized key industries, 
and appropriated land in favor of creating what Chavez termed, a “new socialist 
productive model.”306 Chavez enacted reforms that increased the centralization of power 
and changed the electoral process by eliminating proportional representation in favor of a 
majoritarian system.307  
In the international arena, Chavez continued with his usual rhetoric and anti-
American initiatives. On one occasion, Chavez affirmed that life might have existed in 
Mars but that “imperialism arrived and finished off the planet.”308 He continued the 
promotion of regional integration with initiatives such as a European Union type 
initiative for Latin America called Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and a 
NATO type organization, termed the South American Defense Council.309 The later was 
specifically attractive since it specifically bans U.S. participation. On May 2011, Chavez 
unexpectedly signed a second space cooperation agreement with China for the acquisition 
of an earth observation satellite, Venezuelan Remote Sensing Satellite (VRSS-1).310 This 
move was surprising due to the lack of publicity and information on evaluation and 
selection criteria, but also because of the relatively recent on-orbit failures of Nigcomsat 
and Sinosat-2, and the technical issues with Venesat-1.  
The contract was valued at approximately $140 million and included the 
construction of a Research, Development and Integration Center (Centro de 
Investigacion, Diseño y Ensamblaje de Satelites [CIDE])—a factory to build small 
satellites—in addition to technical personnel training and the ground and space 
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segments.311 The VRSS-1, renamed Francisco de Miranda, was designed for a five-year 
mission life using the CAST-2000 platform with a payload consisting of two sets of high-
resolution and medium-resolution cameras.312 It was launched on 29 September 2012 
onboard a Chinese Long March 2D launch vehicle, and placed in a sun synchronous orbit 
with a 97.93-degree inclination.313 ABAE representatives announced that the satellite’s 
data were to be used in support of government decision-making, environmental 
monitoring, and urban and agricultural planning.314 Chavez affirmed the central role the 
new space capability would play in promoting Venezuela’s social and economic 
development, and in the democratization of space. He also emphasized that VRSS-1 was a 
“tool for the construction of socialism in Venezuela and other American nations.”315  
In reality, VRSS-1 allowed Venezuela to gain domestic imaging capability and to 
join the international disasters monitoring charter.316 It also increased ABAE’s credibility 
with other space agencies in the region, resulting in a number of training engagements.317 
However, these benefits were clouded by the perceived lack of technical rigor involved in 
the establishment of the cooperation agreement. During the time the VRSS-1 contract was 
signed with GWC, other companies offered more capable and proven systems for a lower 
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price. Nigeria’s NigerSat-2318 and Chile’s earth observation satellite system (Sistema 
Satelital par Observación de la Tierra-FASAT-Charlie [SSOT]),319 built by Surrey 
Satellite Technology and EADS Astrium respectively, are two examples. The sudden and 
non-transparent acquisition of VRSS-1 suggests that technical rigor was outweighed by 
political imperatives, although its success helped end Chavez’s second term on a high 
note. 
Chavez went on to win the October 2012 elections with 55.09 percent of the 
popular vote, the lowest since his 1998 victory.320 By this time, his battle with cancer had 
deteriorated his health to a point where he was not even able to attend his inauguration.321 
Chavez’s last televised appearance occurred on 8 December 2012, prior to his departure 
to Cuba for his last cancer treatment, where he announced Vice-President Nicolás 
Maduro as his successor.322  Chavez died on 5 March 2013, leaving his successor what 
appeared to be an unsustainable legacy of political, social, and economic problems.    
F. ENTER NICOLÁS MADURO (2013–PRESENT) 
Nicolás Maduro was elected president in the April 2013 elections by only a 1.5 
percent margin.323 The low level of support given to Chavez’s successor highlighted the 
growing public disenchantment with the Bolivarian regime. Chavez’s death left a void 
that Maduro was unable to fill. As a result, Maduro had no choice but to turn to the tools 
of hyper-presidentialism and neopatrimonialism, established during the advance of 
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Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution.324 These tools turned more authoritarian in nature in the 
absence of Chavez’s charismatic personality and have strengthened the opposition and 
discontent in Venezuelan society.       
On the international arena, Maduro tried to continue the projection of Chavez’s 
Bolivarian revolution with little success. Many of the regional integration initiatives lost 
their splendor due to the diminishing oil prices, which had funded them.325 Regional 
allies such as Ecuador and Bolivia distanced themselves, and even Cuba began 
reconsidering its relationship with the U.S.326  
In spite of the circumstances, Maduro continued Venezuela’s engagement with 
China. Within the first months of his inauguration, Maduro signed an additional series of 
agreements with China involving Venezuela’s energy, finance, agriculture, mining, and 
technology sectors.327 These agreements increased lending and cemented Chinese access 
to Venezuelan energy resources and telecommunications industry. On October 2014, 
Maduro signed a third space cooperation agreement for the acquisition of a second earth 
observation satellite, VRSS-2 (named Antonio Jose de Sucre).328 
The VRSS-2 project was valued at $170 million and was advertised to include 
more Venezuelan involvement and a higher resolution imaging system (1m panchromatic 
and a 4m multi-spectral) imaging payload than VRSS-1 (2.5m panchromatic and 10m 
multi-spectral).329  The agreement followed a $4 billion Chinese credit line increase two 
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months prior330 and ended a dry spell on GWIC export markets.331 The additional credit 
turned Venezuela into China’s biggest lender in Latin America, with a debt of 
approximately $63 billion, which equaled to 53 percent of all Chinese lending to the 
region.332 This context and the lack of information regarding the selection process 
suggest that the agreement was established for political reasons. Maduro needed at least 
one way to add legitimacy to his failing regime, and China needed a customer.  
The VRSS-2 was launched on September 2017 from Jiuquan space base, in the 
midst of criticism.333 Critics could not understand how Maduro’s regime achieved such a 
feat, given the conditions Venezuelans were facing. The Venezuelan government claimed 
the launch was “an exercise in the sovereignty, independence and dignity of the 
Venezuelan people.”334  However, the reality of Venezuela’s political, social, and 
economic situation affirm that the claim was founded on idealism. It its effort for 
independence, Venezuela has become dependent on China. In its effort for sovereignty, 
Venezuela has sold off its precious energy resources. Only time will tell if Venezuela will 
recover its dignity.     
G. ANALYSIS  
The history of Venezuela’s space program is intimately coupled with the advance 
of Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution. The earliest efforts to acquire space capabilities date 
back to the 1970s and followed a very pragmatic approach. Pragmatism was eliminated 
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with the rise of Hugo Chavez. During the last 17 years, Venezuela’s space program has 
been utilized as a means to project nationalist policies, domestically and internationally.  
Chavez’s Bolivarian movement gained strength with the progression of his time 
in office. The 1999 constitution and changes in the electoral process created maneuvering 
space that allowed Chavez to gradually undermine prior checks and balances and 
centralize power in the executive. This was accomplished thanks to the popular support 
received by Chavez’s proposed “third way” of government.335 This form of government 
claimed to be neither capitalist nor socialist, but something in between.  
This subtlety of Chavez’s approach changed after the opposition attempted to 
remove him from power in 2002. From 2002 to 2006, Chavez’s regime became more 
restrictive and nationalistic. His rhetoric became inflammatory and his socialist initiatives 
gained strength, thanks to favorable economic conditions. The space cooperation 
agreement to acquire Venesat-1 was signed during this politically charged environment. 
The deal advanced Chavez’s efforts to promote a multipolar world and strengthened 
Venezuela’s alliance with the main U.S. rival in the international system. China gained 
access to Venezuela’s energy resources, and its space program established a foothold in 
the Latin American market. It is important to note that, although different sources 
confirm the existence of other proposals, it is feasible to assume they did not receive the 
same consideration as the Chinese offer. 
By the end of 2006, the Bolivarian revolution acquired enough momentum to 
allow Chavez to publicly declare his vision to implement twenty-first century socialism. 
However, Venezuelans rejected the proposed plan and therefore Chavez continued his 
charge through other means, such as the space program. The launch of Venesat-1 allowed 
Chavez to establish social programs and to project the message of the Bolivarian 
revolution throughout the region. It helped his regime gain credibility and increase 
control over the national media. Bolivia’s Evo Morales followed his example and signed 
a similar agreement with China for the acquisition of a communications satellite. 
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During the later part of Chavez’s second term, ABAE announced the acquisition 
of VRSS-1. The announcement came as a surprise, due to the technical problems 
associated with Chinese space technology and the lack of publicity. The technical aspects 
of the acquisition and the sociopolitical context confirm that the second Sino-Venezuela 
space cooperation agreement was motivated by political objectives. A very similar 
process was followed by Chavez’s successor on the acquisition of VRSS-2. 
The development of the Venezuelan space program was, and continues to be, 
driven by political objectives. The political context throughout its development suggests 
that the Sino-Venezuelan space cooperation agreement was more of a tool to advance 
Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution than a sound technical approach to acquire space 
capabilities. Although most space programs are influenced by politics, their cooperative 
projects—especially those involving commercial technology transfers—are normally 
established after carefully considering technical factors such as cost and performance and 
use publicly documented processes for selecting the most favorable partnership. 




This thesis sought to find the reasons why cooperative U.S.–Latin American 
space projects have decreased over the last three decades. This primary inquiry was 
underlined by the following questions: why and through what means are Latin American 
countries pursuing space capabilities? Why are they choosing other partners to establish 
their footholds in space or avoiding cooperation all together? Is the reduced number of 
cooperative U.S.–Latin American space projects an indication of a loss of U.S. regional 
influence? Is there an indication of a shift of the “partner of choice”? If so, what are the 
factors “alienating” the U.S. and preventing the establishment of cooperative space 
efforts, and what can be done about it?  
This chapter provides a summary of the research conducted, analyzes the selected 
case studies with regard to the main inquiry, each other, and the proposed hypotheses, 
and proposes a closing argument. This thesis argues that U.S.–Latin American space 
cooperation has decreased due to the increased availability of providers, the maturing 
domestic space sectors, and the committed drive toward technological independence. The 
smaller number of cooperative U.S.–Latin American space projects is not an indication of 
a loss of U.S. regional influence, but instead of a competitive market with a pragmatic 
consumer base. The three identified factors have made the establishment of U.S.–Latin 
American cooperative projects more challenging, but have also increased the potential to 
create win-win relationships. Thus, the United States is not being “alienated” but 
challenged to engage on equitable terms. 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
The first chapter in this thesis posed the following research question: why have 
cooperative U.S.–Latin American space projects decreased over the last three decades? 
This question was tackled through a case study analysis involving the Peruvian, 
Argentine, and Venezuelan space programs. Each space program was analyzed in terms 
of its history, aims, and motivations, and its relation to the socio-political history of the 
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country, with a specific focus on identifying factors that may have contributed or 
hindered the establishment of space cooperation projects.    
Chapter II examined the case of the Peruvian space program with a specific focus 
on the acquisition of its first imaging satellite, PerúSAT-1. Peru’s unique political history 
and involvement in the Chinese-led APSCO suggested a high sense of pragmatism and 
drive to attain space capabilities. These initial assumptions were confirmed by the long 
and pragmatic approach utilized to acquire the PerúSAT-1. The PerúSAT-1 acquisition 
effort began in 2006 when President Toledo signed Law 28799, officially declaring the 
country’s pursuit of remote sensing capabilities. This action was followed by a series of 
feasibility studies that confirmed the need for independent satellite imagery data but were 
unclear on how to attain it. Initially, only a satellite data-receiving station was considered, 
due to the costs associated with imaging satellites. By 2010, the feasibility of owning a 
mini-satellite was affirmed and the effort continued as different providers began engaging 
Peruvian authorities.  
The project became a reality after the official RFP was finally released in 2013. 
Europe’s Airbus Defense and Space was selected amongst competing bids and awarded 
the contract valued at $211 million. The contract included the design, manufacture, and 
launch of the space segment, a data-receiving station in Peru, and personnel training. 
PerúSAT-1 was launched on a contracted European Vega launch vehicle from Kourou in 
French Guiana in 2016, giving Peru access to high-resolution satellite imaging 
capabilities. The added capability augmented the low-resolution imaging data received 
through its partnership with APSCO. Although the effort concluded in a cloud of 
controversy, the benefits gained by Peru suggest it was a success. It is very probable that 
follow-on efforts will be carried out with a higher level of transparency. However, the 
amount of time involved in the acquisition of PerúSAT-1 would most likely discourage 
engagement by at least some potential partners. The contract cost would likely not be 
sufficient to entice potential bidders to exert the level of effort required to win the 
contract.  
Chapter III explored the Argentine space program. The success of the SAC series 
satellites, achieved through the U.S.–Argentine cooperative partnership, suggested the 
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Argentine space program could provide valuable lessons on how to successfully establish 
cooperative space projects in Latin America. In reality, the history of the Argentine space 
program highlighted the importance of institutional capacity and the strategic value of 
space cooperation. The program was established with a great vision and a cooperative 
operational concept. However, its development endured a period of interruption due to 
the aggressive unsanctioned behavior of the Argentine military during the post-
dictatorship Argentina. During this time period, previously established relationships that 
nurtured the development of domestic space launch capabilities were placed on hold, in 
favor of developing the Condor medium-range ballistic missile. The Argentine military 
financed the Condor’s development with external financing, obtained by proliferating 
missile technology to non-aligned states, such as Iraq. The proposed missile capability 
was supposed to make up for the material losses incurred during the Argentine defeat in 
the Falkland Islands war against the United Kingdom. In response, the U.S. and the 
international community placed pressure on Argentina to cease the development of the 
Condor medium-range ballistic missile, until finally President Menem ordered the 
program’s cancellation. 
The cancellation of the Condor medium-range ballistic missile program was 
incentivized further by the prospects of cooperative projects with NASA. After the 
program’s cancellation, U.S.-Argentine cooperative projects were established and 
eventually yielded the successful SAC series satellites and a range of domestic space 
technology manufacturing capabilities. Today, Argentina is unquestionably the region’s 
leader in satellite manufacturing. It has overcome its setbacks and has achieved technical 
and manpower capacity to accomplish complex projects and exert regional leadership. It 
has revived its space launch program and upholds the non-proliferation regime’s 
requirements. Its current success is undoubtedly owed in large part to its relations with 
the United States. 
Chapter IV investigated the case of the Venezuelan space program. This case 
study was selected due to the perceived influence of ideology and for Venezuela’s 
partnership with China. The history of the Venezuelan space program reveals the strong 
influence of Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution. The space program’s politicization 
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increased with Chavez’s time in power. Early Venezuelan space capability pursuits 
involved a high level of pragmatism, as evidenced in Venezuela’s participation in the 
CAN Simon Bolivar satellite project. Chavez abandoned the pragmatism in favor of a 
nationalist approach that allowed him to advance the ideals of the Bolivarian revolution.  
Venezuela established a cooperative relationship with China that has allowed the 
acquisition of one communications and two imaging satellites. The first cooperative 
agreement was established in 2005 for the acquisition of the Venesat-1 communications 
satellite, with a contract cost of $406 million. The second project, valued at $140 million, 
was signed on 2011 for the acquisition of Venezuela’s first remote-sensing satellite, 
VRSS-1. Chavez’s successor signed the last agreement on 2014, procuring the second 
remote-sensing satellite, VRSS-2. All three agreements purportedly advanced the 
Bolivarian objective of promoting a multipolar world and strengthened Venezuela’s 
alliance with China. They also fed the rhetoric of the Chavez and Maduro regimes, and 
helped advance regional integration initiatives.  
The lack of transparency and technical rigor, especially evident in the last two 
projects, suggests that that the Sino-Venezuelan space cooperation agreements were a 
tool to advance Chavez’s Bolivarian political objectives. Even though most space 
programs are influenced by politics, their cooperative projects—especially those 
involving commercial technology transfers—are normally established after carefully 
considering technical factors, such as cost and performance, and use publicly documented 
processes for selecting the most favorable partnership. The influence of politics on the 
Venezuelan space program has led to prodigal spending that could have been fruitful 
elsewhere.  
B. FINDINGS 
This study, examined the history of the Peruvian, Argentine, and Venezuelan 
space programs, with a specific focus on their approach to space cooperation. The 
programs’ development, motivations, and aims were assessed in terms of the domestic 
and international socio-political contexts.  
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All three cases demonstrated a strong drive to acquire space capabilities from 
early in the rocket and space age. Peruvian efforts can be traced to Paulet’s experiments 
with liquid rocket engines in the 1800s, although its space program was not established 
until the early 1970s. Teófilo Tabanera pioneered Argentine efforts beginning in the 
1960s through the establishment of the Argentine Interplanetary Society and the National 
Commission for Space Research (Comisión Nacional de Investigaciones Espaciales 
[CNIE]). Venezuela began its pursuits through its joint effort with the members of the 
CAN in the 1970s.  
The official establishment of all three programs and their subsequent investments 
in procuring space technology was justified by their potential to contribute to the 
developmental goals of their respective nation. The Peruvian PerúSAT-1 was advertised 
as a tool to foster development in various sectors of Peru’s economy. Various CONIDA 
presentations cited the financial benefits of the acquisition, and even provided return on 
investment calculations. The Peruvian national space plan stressed the importance of 
space technology for development. Similarly, the Argentine national space plan was 
structured specifically to address the needs of six user sectors, through an information 
cycle that delivers pertinent data acquired by space assets. The mission and vision of the 
Venezuelan space program reflect its focus on promoting development, in addition to its 
contributions to advancing the regime’s political objectives. The “space as a development 
tool argument” is amply used to justify the investment of resources in the procurement of 
space capabilities, instead of more apparent and urgent economic needs.  
The limited availability of resources—financial, technical expertise, 
infrastructure—made space cooperation a necessity in all three cases. In the case of Peru 
and Venezuela, the constraints in funding were less of a burden than the lack of technical 
expertise. The Peruvian case shows that the acquisition of PerúSAT-1 became financially 
feasible thanks to a decade-long period of consistent economic growth. However, Peru 
still had to contract outside help to conduct all of the technical aspects of the acquisition, 
to include feasibility studies and market research. The contract also had to include 
technical training due to the lack of domestic expertise. Similarly, Venezuela relied on 
China to provide technical personnel training. In the Argentine case, the main factor that 
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pushed toward cooperation was cost sharing. The Argentine space program benefited 
from the highly educated German immigrants that arrived in Argentina as a result of 
WWII. These individuals were key for the development of the domestic technical 
expertise that allowed for the design and manufacture of the bus for SAC-B, only five 
years after CONAE was established. Even though Argentine satellite manufacturing 
capabilities increased dramatically, the country’s lack of launch capabilities necessitated 
its engagement in cooperative projects.  
Space cooperation might be a necessity for the time being, but technological 
independence is the ultimate goal. All three cases show a drive toward breaking their 
dependency on foreign technology. They strive to move from being consumers toward 
being producers. Peru acquired its PerúSAT-1 so that it could stop paying foreign 
companies for imaging data. Argentina established INVAP and AR-SAT to mature its 
satellite manufacturing capabilities, and not to have to rely on foreign technology. 
Venezuela has prioritized its manpower development in order to nationalize the 
production of advanced technology. Although each program is found in a different stage, 
they are all advancing toward the same goal. The Tronador project might allow 
Argentina to reach the goal first.  
Prestige is also a significant motivator behind Latin American efforts to acquire 
space capabilities. Indeed, Peruvian authorities have bragged about PerúSAT-1 sub-meter 
imaging capabilities and how it was the most advanced satellite in the region. Argentina 
self-categorized itself as a pais espacial (space country). In Venezuela, Chavez boasted 
about his efforts to “democratize” space. All three cases showed pride in belonging to the 
elite group of spacefaring nations.  
 The restrictions imposed by ITAR are not an issue if financial or strategic 
benefits are sufficient to entice engagement. The tightening of ITAR began in 1999 and 
was not revised until 2009, although the changes were not implemented until 2014. 
Throughout this time period, NASA-Argentine cooperation continued due to the strategic 
benefit of promoting non-proliferation. U.S. engagement continued even when President 
Kirchner’s rhetoric suggested misalignment. On the other hand, the low contract value of 
the Venesat-1 and PerúSAT-1 projects was most likely insufficient to entice American 
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engagement. ITAR may have been an issue in Venezuela’s second and third space 
cooperation agreements, considering that by the time they were contracted, Venezuela 
was subject to a U.S. arms embargo. Although relaxation of ITAR was a step in the right 
direction, further work needs to be done to incentivizing the commercial sector to engage 
the developing world.   
Latin America’s expanding satellite market is attracting a growing list of 
international providers. European space companies Airbus Defense and Space, Thales 
Alenia, and Surrey Satellite Technology are new providers with growing influence in the 
region. China’s GWIC has also gained ground through its engagements with Venezuela, 
Bolivia, and Brazil, although the agreements were politically motivated and facilitated by 
Chinese financing. But for the countries that want the best bang for their buck, European 
companies seem to be the way to go. Peru’s PeruSAT-1, Chile’s FASat (A-B-C), and 
Brazil’s Star One series satellites are only a few European-made examples. 
The Argentine and Venezuelan cases showed that the social-political environment 
could affect space cooperation. Argentina’s cooperative nature was interrupted by the 
turmoil of its political history. Venezuela’s space program became a tool to advance 
Chavez’s Bolivarian political objectives. Fortunately, politics can also have the opposite 
effect. President Menem’s political approach promoted the establishment of perhaps the 
most successful U.S.–Latin American cooperation effort so far. 
C. RE-EXAMINATION OF THE HYPOTHESES  
The review of related available literature produced three hypotheses for the 
proposed question. The first suggested the decreased number of U.S.–Latin American 
space cooperation projects has resulted from neglect, primarily as a result of the region’s 
low strategic importance to the United States. The second argued the decrease in U.S.–
Latin American space cooperation projects is a result of Latin American “push-away” or 
lack of desire to engage the U.S. in partnership. The third hypothesis proposed that space 
cooperation has been limited due to a combination of hindering factors, such as harsh 
U.S. trade restrictions, issues of trust, conflicting goals, and the varied availability of 
providers.    
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The continuous U.S. engagement and favorable relations, evident in the Peruvian 
and Argentine cases dismisses the neglect argument in the first hypothesis. U.S.–Peruvian 
economic and political relations remained steady even during President Garcia’s term. 
The U.S. absence in the PerúSAT-1 contract contest resulted from a lack of financial 
incentives, rather than negligence. The Argentine case showed the continuance of the 
SAC series cooperative project in spite of perceived political misalignment. The lack of 
U.S. engagement in Venezuela was a result of Chavez’s anti-American policies. 
American companies would have most likely been engaged if Venezuela’s political 
environment had been different, especially considering that past U.S.-Venezuelan 
relations allowed the transfer of F-16 fighter jets. Furthermore, the continuous U.S. 
engagement through SOUTHCOM highlights the strategic importance of the region.  
The second hypothesis comes closer to answering the research question, 
especially considering the Venezuelan case study. Chavez purposefully established the 
Sino-Venezuelan partnership as an anti-American measure. The socialist ideals of the 
Bolivarian revolution are in direct conflict with liberal democratic principles. However, 
Chavez’s “push-away” is a unique case that cannot be used to generalize about the entire 
region. For example, even though Bolivia followed Chavez’s example in rhetoric—and 
even in the purchase of a Chinese satellite—the economic and political approach used by 
the Morales administration was not misaligned with Washington.336 Furthermore, the 
Peruvian and Argentine cases showed continuous U.S. engagement. Consequently, it can 
be concluded that Latin America in general is not pushing itself away from the U.S. 
Venezuela’s push will most likely end with the eventual return of democracy. 
The third hypothesis most suitably addresses the research question, although the 
identified hindering factors are different from the ones originally proposed. U.S.–Latin 
American space cooperation has decreased due to the increased availability of other 
providers, the maturing domestic space sectors, and the committed drive toward 
technological independence. The growing number of foreign companies targeting the 
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Latin American market is evident in all three cases. European companies and China have 
purposefully developed products to suit regional needs and, as a result, they have been 
able to establish various partnerships. The increased availability of providers allows Latin 
American countries to be selective and to establish partnerships based on their particular 
priorities, to include political objectives, as in the case of Venezuela. A crowded market 
also makes for stiffer competition. This could consequently further disincentivize 
engagement by certain partners, such as U.S. companies.  
All three cases showed a maturing regional space sector. The Argentine space 
program is the prime example with its well-developed satellite manufacturing capabilities 
and promising space launch efforts. But Peru and Venezuela are also moving forward. 
Their cooperative projects have increased the technical proficiency of their workforces 
and have placed them on the path toward further developments.  
Lastly, the committed drive toward achieving technological independence is 
clearly manifested in all three case studies. During PerúSAT-1’s acquisition, CONIDA 
representatives and other space sector advocates pushed to add a technology transfer 
clause to the project’s contract. Venezuelan “Bolivarian way” of acquiring foreign 
technology prioritizes technology transfer. The Argentine space program revived its 
space launch pursuits in order to break their dependency. All these efforts are 
understandable, considering the benefits of technological independence.   
The assertions of the third hypothesis best answer the inquiry’s underlying 
questions. Latin American countries are pursuing space capabilities mainly to support 
socio-economic development efforts. Their specific resource constraints motivate them to 
pursue cooperative projects. The increasing availability of providers allows for greater 
flexibility, and Latin American countries chose engagements that best suit their 
requirements. Therefore, the smaller number of cooperative U.S.–Latin American space 
projects is not an indication of a loss of U.S. regional influence, but instead of a 
competitive market with pragmatic consumer base. Thus, the U.S. is not being 
“alienated” but challenged to engage on equitable terms.  
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D. IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings of this research support the argument that U.S.–Latin American 
space cooperation has decreased over the last three decades, due to the increased 
availability of providers, the maturing domestic space sectors, and a committed drive 
toward technological independence. These three factors have made the establishment of 
U.S.–Latin American cooperative projects more challenging, but not impossible. 
However, the U.S. must first acknowledge the importance of these factors in the U.S.–
Latin American cooperation equation, in order to formulate an appropriate approach.    
The U.S. approach must first consider the competitive nature of the Latin 
American space sector and gain an advantage by carefully analyzing the motivations and 
aims of the subject country, in light of its specific socio-political and economic context. 
This could be accomplished through continuous engagement via embassy teams and by 
facilitating more in-depth communication with commercial sector representatives.  
Second, the approach must be tailored in accordance with U.S. strengths. The 
strength of the U.S. space enterprise lies unquestionably in its commercial sector. 
However, the lack of financial incentives to engage developing countries has contributed 
to a decrease in U.S.—Latin American cooperative projects. The U.S. could increase the 
commercial sector’s engagement by providing tax incentives for companies that chose to 
engage developing countries or by promoting the establishment of firms that focus 
primarily on new entrants. These incentives could be adjusted according to U.S. strategic 
objectives in the particular country or region. Additionally, work could also be done to 
streamline the foreign sales licensing process dictated by ITAR, either by loosening the 
restrictions or by making process information more readably available.    
 Third, the U.S. could increase its participation in multi-lateral organizations such 
as the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters. These organizations provide 
opportunities to engage space program representatives from countries with non-
permissive political environments, such as Venezuela. 
Lastly, the U.S. focus should be fixed on the strategic gains of cooperating with 
Latin American countries. The Argentine case showed that space cooperation played a 
pivotal role in incentivizing the country’s adherence to non-proliferation regimes. 
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Similarly, Brazil’s adherence to the MTCR was rewarded with an invitation to participate 
in the ISS.337 Given the growing number of Latin American countries with space 
programs and U.S. reliance on space capabilities, it makes sense to consider addressing 
these factors in the U.S.–Latin American space cooperation equation, in order to assure 
an outcome that aligns with and advances U.S. interests.   
 
  
                                                 
337 Moltz, “Brazil’s Space Program,” 15. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.   Latin American Payloads Registered between 1985–1995338 
 
                                                 
338 Data displayed on this table is based on data found in the UNOOSA registry database, obtained by using search function to produce a list of payloads 
registered by Latin American countries. Each Latin American country was searched and the registered assets were researched to determine the parties involved in 
their manufacture using open source information and websites such as SpaceflightNow, Gunter’s Space Page, NASA SpaceFlight, and other prime contractor 
sites.  
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339 Data displayed on this table is based on data found in the UNOOSA registry database, obtained by using search function to produce a list of payloads 
registered by Latin American countries. Each Latin American country was searched and the registered assets were researched to determine the parties involved in 
their manufacture using open source information and websites such as SpaceflightNow, Gunter’s Space Page, NASA SpaceFlight, and other prime contractor 
sites. 
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Table 3.   Latin American Payloads Registered between 2006–2015340 
 
                                                 
340 Data displayed on this table is based on data found in the UNOOSA registry database, obtained by using search function to produce a list of payloads 
registered by Latin American countries. Each Latin American country was searched and the registered assets were researched to determine the parties involved in 
their manufacture using open source information and websites such as SpaceflightNow, Gunter’s Space Page, NASA SpaceFlight, and other prime contractor 
sites. 
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341 Data displayed on this table is based on data found in the UNOOSA registry database, obtained by using search function to produce a list of payloads 
registered by Latin American countries. Each Latin American country was searched and the registered assets were researched to determine the parties involved in 
their manufacture using open source information and websites such as SpaceflightNow, Gunter’s Space Page, NASA SpaceFlight, and other prime contractor 
sites. 
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